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As most of us are aware, noncompliance with the tax law can lead to tax pen-
alties, which almost always take the form of monetary sanctions. But noncompli-
ance with the tax law can have other consequences as well. Collateral sanctions for 
tax noncompliance—which apply on top of traditional tax penalties to revoke or 
deny government-provided benefits—increasingly apply to individuals who have 
failed to obey the tax law. They range from denial of hunting permits to suspension 
of driver’s licenses to revocation of passports. Further, as the recent Supreme Court 
case Kawashima v. Holder demonstrates, some individuals who are subject to tax 
penalties for committing tax offenses involving “fraud or deceit” may even face 
deportation from the United States.  
When analyzing sanctions as incentives for tax compliance, tax scholars have 
focused almost exclusively on the design and implementation of monetary penalties. 
This Article, in contrast, introduces the collateral tax sanction as a new form of tax 
penalty that does not require noncompliant taxpayers to pay the government money 
and that does not require a taxing authority to implement it. Drawing on behavioral 
research and experiments in the tax context and other areas, I argue that collateral 
tax sanctions can promote voluntary tax compliance more effectively than the threat 
of additional monetary tax penalties, especially if governments increase public 
awareness of these sanctions. Governments should therefore embrace collateral tax 
sanctions as a means of tax enforcement, and taxing authorities should publicize 
them affirmatively. 
After considering the effects of collateral tax sanctions under the predominant 
theories of voluntary compliance, I propose principles that governments should 
consider when designing collateral tax sanctions. These principles suggest, for 
example, that initiatives to revoke driver’s licenses or professional licenses from 
individuals who fail to file tax returns or pay outstanding taxes would likely 
promote tax compliance. However, whether the sanction of deportation for tax 
offenses involving fraud or deceit will have positive compliance effects is far less 
certain. Finally, I suggest how taxing authorities should publicize these sanctions to 
foster voluntary compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tucked in the corner of one of the dozens of strip malls along Ventura 
Boulevard in California’s San Fernando Valley, the Japanese restaurant Cho 
Cho San serves spicy tuna rolls, shrimp tempura, and a menu of other 
entrées favored by the American palate.1 Its owners, Akio and Fusako 
Kawashima, arrived in the United States in 1982 in search of opportunity, 
and through hard work and good fortune, established the profitable restau-
rant chain.2 Their business success, however, did not extend to their deal-
ings with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In 1997, IRS agents 
determined that the couple underpaid taxes on their restaurant income by 
 
1 Locations, CHO CHO SAN, http://chochosan.com/loc/html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); 
Menu, CHO CHO SAN, http://www.chochosan.com/menu.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
2 Brief for Petitioners at 3, Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012) (No. 10-577); see also 
Teresa Rochester, Thousand Oaks Family at Heart of Supreme Court Deportation Case, VENTURA 
COUNTY STAR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2012/feb/28/thousand-oaks-family-at-
heart-of-us-supreme (describing the couple’s years in the United States). 
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nearly a quarter of a million dollars over several years.3 Rather than face a 
criminal trial, Mr. Kawashima pleaded guilty to willfully making a false tax 
return, and Mrs. Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting the 
preparation of a false tax return.4 The Kawashimas agreed to pay back the 
taxes owed plus tax penalties and interest and were sentenced to four 
months in prison.5 Almost three years later, after reestablishing themselves 
as “exemplary” members of their community,6 the Kawashimas received an 
unexpected notice from the immigration authorities.7 As a result of their 
prior guilty pleas in their tax case, they faced deportation to their native 
country of Japan and the prospect of leaving their children and American 
lives behind.8 
The story of Kawashima v. Holder,9 decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 2012, illustrates a curious chain of events. After incurring a 
tax penalty and prison time, the taxpayers faced the additional sanction of 
deportation as a result of the same tax offense. Criminal law scholars refer to 
such additional sanctions as the “collateral consequences” of criminal 
convictions.10 For example, a convicted individual may be prohibited from 
holding certain public or private sector employment11 or from serving on 
juries12 following a prison sentence. I describe the Kawashimas’ added 
sanction here as a “collateral tax sanction.” The sanction applied on top of 
monetary tax penalties and prison sentences, revoked a privilege provided 
 
3 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 3-4 (“[T]he total actual tax loss was $245,126.”). 
4 Id.; Opening Brief for Petitioners at 6, Kawashima v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 
2007) (No. 04-74313). 
5 Opening Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 6. 
6 Opening Brief for Petitioners at 18, Kawashima v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 05-74408) (quoting retired Deputy Sheriff Steven Smith). 
7 Id. at 11. 
8 Id. 
9 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012). 
10 For a small sampling of the literature on collateral consequences, see Gabriel J. Chin, Race, 
the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 253 (2002); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A 
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10; Michael 
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
623 (2006); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO 
PUBLIC SAFETY 18-19 (2006) (describing employment obstacles faced by convicted felons). 
12 See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 131-
42 (2003) (criticizing statutes that ban felons from serving on juries as penologically unjustified). 
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by the government instead of requiring additional monetary payment, and 
was imposed by an agency other than the taxing authority.  
It may appear unusual to tax practitioners and tax scholars that the 
Kawashimas’ additional, nonmonetary sanction for tax noncompliance was 
levied by an agency other than the IRS. However, collateral tax sanctions 
are increasingly used in other contexts. In recent years, federal agencies and 
state governments have started to apply collateral tax sanctions to combat 
tax delinquency, an offense that occurs when a taxpayer fails to pay an 
established tax liability in a timely manner. For example, under current and 
proposed federal rules, failure to pay taxes owed may result not only in civil 
and criminal tax penalties,13 but also in loss of ability to apply for Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA) mortgages, 14  enter into contracts with the 
federal government,15 and hold a United States passport.16 Likewise, several 
states suspend driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations,17 revoke law and other 
professional licenses,18 and deny hunting and gaming permits19 to residents 
who fail to satisfy their tax obligations. Criminal law scholars have written 
 
13 See generally I.R.C. §§ 6651–6725 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (prescribing civil tax penalties); 
I.R.C. §§ 7201–7217 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (prescribing criminal tax penalties). 
14  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING HANDBOOK NO. 4155.1, 
MORTGAGE CREDIT ANALYSIS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE ON ONE- TO FOUR-UNIT 
MORTGAGE LOANS 4.A.2.F (2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/ 
handbooks/hsgh/4155.1/41551HSGH.pdf (deeming a borrower ineligible for an FHA mortgage 
until a delinquent federal tax debt is resolved). 
15 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, § 527, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 
125 Stat. 552, 636 (2011). 
16 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 40304 
(2012) (proposing passport revocation or denial for a “seriously delinquent tax debt”); see generally 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-272, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION: 
POTENTIAL FOR USING PASSPORT ISSUANCE TO INCREASE COLLECTION OF UNPAID 
TAXES 17 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11272.pdf (“Congress may wish . . . 
to enable and require the Secretary of State to screen and prevent individuals who owe federal 
taxes from receiving passports . . . .”).  
17 See, e.g., California to Tax Scofflaws: Pay Up Or Lose Your Driver’s (or CPA) License, AC-
COUNTINGWEB (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/tax/california-tax-scofflaws-
pay-or-lose-your-drivers-license (describing California’s driver’s license suspension program). See 
generally Jay A. Soled, Using Driving Privilege to Solve States’ Fiscal Crises, 60 STATE TAX NOTES 
841, 841-42 (2011) (arguing in favor of suspending driver’s licenses for residents who are not 
current on their tax payments). 
18 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 270C.72(1) (2012) (mandating the revocation of a professional 
license if the license holder owes delinquent taxes); WIS. STAT. § 73.0301(1)(d)(11), (2)(b)(1)(a) 
(2012) (mandating the revocation of a law license if a license holder is liable for delinquent taxes). 
19  See, e.g., Hunting Licenses, LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, 
http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/licenses/hunting-licenses (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (requiring 
license applicants to have filed a state income tax return and complied with state income tax 
regulations). 
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dozens of articles on the collateral consequences of criminal convictions.20 Yet 
tax scholars have virtually ignored similar consequences in the taxation 
context. 
Instead, when analyzing sanctions as incentives for tax compliance, tax 
scholars have focused almost exclusively on the design and implementation 
of monetary tax penalties.21 This Article, in contrast, introduces the collat-
eral tax sanction as a new form of tax penalty that neither requires noncom-
pliant taxpayers to pay the government money nor requires the taxing 
authority to apply it. To explore this overlooked aspect of tax enforcement, 
this Article considers several questions: Why do collateral tax sanctions 
appear to encourage individuals to pay their tax debts where monetary tax 
penalties have failed? Could collateral tax sanctions influence individuals’ 
tax compliance decisions in areas other than the payment of outstanding tax 
liabilities? And how, if at all, should taxing authorities, as opposed to other 
government agencies, publicize the existence of collateral tax sanctions? 
Drawing on behavioral research and experiments in the tax context and 
other areas, I argue that collateral tax sanctions can promote voluntary tax 
compliance more effectively than the threat of additional monetary tax 
penalties, especially if governments increase public awareness of these 
sanctions. I conclude that governments should embrace collateral tax 
sanctions as a means of tax enforcement and that taxing authorities should 
publicize them affirmatively. 
To begin this investigation, I examine differences between collateral tax 
sanctions and traditional monetary tax penalties. I also consider the signifi-
cance of these differences in light of potential tax compliance motivations 
presented in the tax literature.22 I find that collateral tax sanctions possess 
several unique features that traditional monetary tax penalties lack. Several 
features, I argue, enable collateral tax sanctions to encourage voluntary 
compliance more effectively than traditional monetary tax penalties.  
First, collateral tax sanctions are more salient than traditional monetary 
tax penalties, thus enabling them to exploit powerful cognitive biases.23 The 
 
20 See, e.g., supra note 10. 
21 See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 122-
45 (2009) (discussing current tax penalties’ role in defining tax compliance); Kyle D. Logue, 
Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 257-63 
(2007) (proposing strict-liability tax penalties); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in 
Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 580-605 
(2006) (criticizing civil tax penalties’ design and proposing alternatives).  
22 See infra Section II.B. 
23 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DE-
CISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 25 (rev. ed. 2009) (noting that salience 
is closely related to the availability bias); Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 
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salience of collateral tax sanctions can, in turn, create greater deterrence 
than traditional monetary tax penalties. Second, by targeting specific 
government benefits and services for which individuals have developed 
feelings of entitlement, collateral tax sanctions provoke individuals’ loss 
aversion biases. This bias leads to a desire to avoid incurring losses (as 
compared to acquiring gains) and the endowment effect.24 Third, certain 
collateral tax sanctions can result in greater indirect economic costs than 
monetary tax penalties, particularly with respect to individuals with a 
greater ability to pay. These indirect costs may cause collateral tax sanctions 
to induce compliance from wealthy taxpayers more effectively than mone-
tary tax penalties.25 Fourth, certain collateral tax sanctions emit negative 
reputational signals26 by forcing individuals to reveal to others that they 
have failed to pay their taxes.27 Fifth, the observability of many collateral 
tax sanctions, as opposed to monetary tax penalties applied behind the 
curtain of taxpayer privacy, 28  can bolster confidence among taxpayers 
motivated by feelings of reciprocity.29 Last, when collateral tax sanctions 
require taxpayers to forfeit specific government benefits rather than money, 
 
EMORY L.J. 265, 287-322 (2011) (describing the effects of salience and cognitive biases on 
individuals’ tax compliance decisions); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (detailing how 
companies manipulate the market by using salience to exploit consumers’ psychological traits); 
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1876 (1994) (noting the 
“disproportionate [cognitive] impact of salient or vivid information”); Deborah H. Schenk, 
Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 261-63 (2011) (discussing 
salience in “th[e] sense of prominence or visibility” with regard to hidden taxes); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (describing loss aversion bias, 
wherein an individual’s “response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains”), in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11-14 (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
24 See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193-94, 197-203 (explaining that the endowment effect causes 
individuals to “demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to 
acquire it” and describing the different psychological effects of losses versus gains); Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions (describing loss aversion bias, 
wherein an individual’s “response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains”), in 
RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 64, 74-75 
(Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). 
25 See infra subsection II.B.3. 
26 See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781, 1786-91 (2000) (arguing that an individual complies with the tax law to avoid sending a signal 
to others that he is a “bad type”). 
27 See infra subsection II.B.4.  
28 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006). 
29 See infra subsection II.B.5. 
  
2014] Collateral Compliance 727 
 
they promote the perception that tax dollars fund critical government 
services and thus that tax compliance is a duty of citizenship.30 
After considering the compliance benefits of collateral tax sanctions and 
potential drawbacks under the predominant theories of voluntary compli-
ance, I propose guiding principles that governments should consider when 
designing collateral tax sanctions.31 Specifically, I argue that collateral tax 
sanctions are most effective as a means of promoting tax compliance where 
(1) the tax offense results from a violation of a tax rule, not a tax standard; 
(2) the taxing authority, as opposed to another government agency, determines 
that a taxpayer has committed the tax offense; and (3) the collateral tax 
sanction is proportionate to the tax offense.  
I then apply this proposed framework to determine whether a variety of 
specific tax offenses, including offenses other than nonpayment of taxes, 
should subject offenders to collateral tax sanctions. These examples suggest 
that initiatives to revoke professional licenses from individuals who have 
failed to file their tax returns would likely promote voluntary compliance.32 
However, whether the threat of deportation as punishment for tax offenses 
“involving fraud or deceit,” such as the collateral tax sanction at issue in 
Kawashima, will have positive effects on voluntary compliance is far less 
certain.33 In addition, I consider the role that the taxing authority should 
play in publicizing collateral tax sanctions.34  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the 
concept of collateral tax sanctions and illustrates their current application. 
Part II investigates why collateral tax sanctions can promote individual tax 
compliance more effectively than additional monetary tax penalties. Part III 
proposes principles that governments should consider when designing 
collateral tax sanctions and addresses publicity strategies that taxing authorities 
should adopt. Finally, the Conclusion argues that taxing authorities should 
embrace collateral tax sanctions as a means of tax enforcement. 
 
30 See Richard M. Bird, Tax Challenges Facing Developing Countries 19-20 (Inst. for Int’l Bus., 
Working Paper No. 9, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/id=1114084 (discussing the importance of 
linking expenditure with revenue decisions); Your 2012 Federal Tax Receipt, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/2012tax-receipt (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (allowing taxpayers to see a 
detailed allocation of individual tax payments to government programs and services). 
31 See Section III.A. 
32 See infra Section III.B. 
33 See infra subsection III.B.3.  
34 See infra Section III.C.  
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I. THE RISE OF COLLATERAL TAX SANCTIONS 
If you ask most people what will happen to them if they fail to pay their 
taxes, they will probably respond with one or more of the following: audits, 
tax penalties, or maybe even prison. While these are familiar possibilities to 
much of the population,35 a host of additional sanctions that are adminis-
tered by agencies other than the taxing authority may also apply. Unlike 
traditional tax penalties that require noncompliant taxpayers to pay money 
to the taxing authority, collateral tax sanctions require noncompliant 
taxpayers to forfeit a nonmonetary government benefit or service. Both the 
federal and state governments are increasingly using non-tax agencies to 
deploy collateral tax sanctions to combat tax noncompliance. This Part 
briefly describes existing traditional monetary tax penalties and the tax law 
scholarship that addresses them. It then introduces the contrasting model of 
collateral tax sanctions and provides examples of their use at the federal and 
state levels. Finally, it outlines several important questions that collateral 
tax sanctions raise for both tax scholars and policymakers. 
A. Monetary Tax Penalties 
Tax noncompliance is a major problem in the United States. A govern-
ment’s “tax gap” is the difference between the amount of taxes that taxpayers 
should pay and the amount that they actually pay voluntarily and on time.36 
At the federal level alone, the latest estimate of the United States’ gross 
annual tax gap is approximately $450 billion,37 though many critics of the 
U.S. Treasury’s method of estimating the tax gap have argued that it is 
likely far greater.38 The majority of this amount (approximately $376 billion) 
results from taxpayers failing to report their full tax liability on a timely 
filed return, otherwise referred to as “underreporting.”39 While underreporting 
is typically the primary focus of tax scholars and policymakers, taxpayers’ 
failure to pay their established tax liability—otherwise referred to as 
“underpayment” or “tax delinquency”40—represents a substantial portion 
 
35 For a discussion of popular perceptions of formal tax penalties, see Blank, supra note 23, at 
299. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Six Decades of the Federal Income Tax in Sitcoms, 117 TAX 
NOTES 1265 (2007). 
36 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 5-6 (2006). 
37 IRS, TAX GAP “MAP”: TAX YEAR 2006 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf. 
38 See, e.g., Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007) (describing weak-
nesses in the current tax gap methodology). 
39 IRS, supra note 37.  
40 Id. 
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(approximately $46 billion) of the annual federal gross tax gap.41 For these 
noncompliant taxpayers, there is no dispute that they owe a certain amount 
of tax liability; they just do not pay. Additionally, every year, hundreds of 
thousands of taxpayers, owing approximately $28 billion in federal taxes in 
the aggregate, simply fail to file federal tax returns at all.42  
Governments most commonly respond to the existence of tax noncom-
pliance with tax penalties. Governments rely on tax penalties to promote 
voluntary compliance with the tax law by deterring noncompliant taxpayers 
and by bolstering confidence in compliant taxpayers that the government 
punishes tax abuse.43 In most cases, governments turn to civil tax penalties, 
which require taxpayers to pay additional money to the taxing authority, as 
a way to prevent and reduce tax noncompliance. Governments also threaten 
to subject taxpayers to criminal tax penalties in the case of tax fraud, but 
they rarely impose extreme penalties such as the loss of liberty (i.e., prison) 
on noncompliant taxpayers.44 At the federal level, the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC) contains over one hundred separate civil monetary tax penal-
ties,45 and the IRS regularly applies many of these penalties. State tax 
systems often conform to the federal tax system and also impose a myriad of 
civil tax penalties on taxpayers in addition to the tax liability owed.46 
Generally, monetary tax penalties are either percentage tax penalties or flat 
tax penalties. 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., July 2001, at 
15; see also Blank, supra note 23, at 293. 
44 The number of criminal prosecutions that the federal government pursues each year, for 
example, represents a miniscule percentage of tax returns filed and is dwarfed by the number of 
civil tax penalties that the IRS imposes. In 2009, the federal government authorized the prosecu-
tion of 1210 criminal tax cases. TAX DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET 25 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-tax-justification. 
pdf. This number represents 0.00086% of the total individual tax returns filed in 2009. See IRS, 
ALL RETURNS: NUMBER OF RETURNS, BY AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND SIZE OF ADJUSTED 
GROSS INCOME, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-Statistical-
Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income (see heading “Individual Tax Returns Filed and Sources 
of Income,” then subheading “All Returns: Number of Returns,” and click “2009”) (last updated 
Aug. 12, 2013) (showing that 140,494,127 individual tax returns were filed in 2009). 
45 See generally I.R.C. §§ 6651–6702 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
46 See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., PENALTY REFERENCE CHART (2012), 
available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1024.pdf (listing federal tax penalties and their 
corresponding California counterparts). 
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1. Percentage Tax Penalties 
Monetary tax penalties that consist of a portion of the taxpayers’ under-
payment of tax liability can be described as “percentage tax penalties.” Some 
of the most commonly known percentage tax penalties include delinquency 
penalties, whereby taxpayers who fail to pay their taxes on time owe an 
additional penalty equal to up to 25% of their tax liability;47 accuracy 
penalties, whereby taxpayers who underpay their taxes through various acts, 
such as negligence, owe an additional tax penalty equal to 20% of their tax 
liability;48 and civil fraud penalties, whereby taxpayers who intentionally 
underpay their taxes owe an additional penalty equal to 75% of their tax 
liability.49 At the federal level, percentage tax penalties are the tax penalties 
that the IRS applies most frequently.50  
2. Flat Tax Penalties 
The alternative form of monetary tax penalties that appears regularly in 
the tax law are “flat tax penalties,” which simply consist of a stated dollar 
amount that taxpayers must pay for every occurrence of a specified offense. 
For example, the federal tax law includes flat tax penalties such as $50,000 
for every instance of failing to file a return or submit required information 
relating to “reportable transactions”;51 $1 per day for each day that a taxpayer 
fails to file a notification of change of status of a pension plan;52 and $500 
for every instance of providing a false statement regarding tax withholdings.53 
Under the classic rational actor model, taxpayers weigh the expected 
benefit of claiming a particular tax position (i.e., the tax savings discounted 
by the probability that the IRS will detect the position) against the ex-
pected cost of claiming the tax position (i.e., monetary tax penalties and 
interest discounted by the probability that the IRS will not detect the 
position).54 Several tax scholars have argued that the current low rates of 
 
47 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1)-(2). 
48 I.R.C. § 6662. 
49 I.R.C. § 6663. 
50 In 2012, for example, there were over 17 million instances where the IRS assessed civil 
delinquency tax penalties on taxpayers who failed to pay their outstanding tax penalties in a timely 
manner, resulting in the collection of over $5.6 billion in monetary tax penalties alone. See IRS, 
2012 DATA BOOK 42 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12databk.pdf. 
51 I.R.C. § 6707A. 
52 I.R.C. § 6652(d)(2). 
53 I.R.C. § 6682. 
54 See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 819 (1998) (noting 
that economists traditionally model tax cheating “as if it were adding one more risky asset to a 
household’s portfolio”). 
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detection—the audit rate for individual taxpayers hovers just over one 
percent—cause monetary tax penalties, by themselves, to be a weak deterrent 
against tax noncompliance for rational taxpayers.55 Further, civil tax penalty 
rules often allow taxpayers to claim specified defenses, such as “reasonable 
cause” or reliance on “substantial authority,” that enable them to escape the 
imposition of these penalties.56 Despite the low probability that the IRS 
will ultimately subject most noncompliant taxpayers to monetary tax 
penalties, Congress has rarely raised the nominal amount of these monetary 
tax penalties, except in cases of specific highly publicized threats.57  
The limited ability of existing monetary tax penalties to deter tax non-
compliance has led many tax scholars to propose a variety of alternative 
approaches. Alex Raskolnikov, for instance, has proposed a “self-adjusting 
tax penalty” whereby taxpayers who report an illegitimate deduction on the 
same line of the tax return as a legitimate deduction (which would often 
mask the illegitimate deduction) would be subject to a monetary tax penalty 
that is based not on the value of the illegitimate deduction, but rather on 
the value of the legitimate deduction.58 Similarly, Kyle Logue has extrapo-
lated from the classic Bentham–Becker fine a proposal for a strict-liability 
monetary tax penalty that would be equal to the taxpayer’s underpaid tax 
divided by the probability that the taxpayer’s noncompliance would be 
detected ex ante.59 As an alternative to adjusting the magnitude of monetary 
tax penalties themselves, Eric Zolt has argued that Congress should subject 
its enactment of tax penalties to the same type of reporting procedures that 
apply to tax expenditures in order to justify the use of this instrument to 
shape taxpayer behavior.60 Other tax scholars, such as Steven Johnson, have 
argued that the effectiveness of monetary tax penalties could be improved if 
 
55 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 21, at 126-28; Logue, supra note 21, at 264-71; Raskolnikov, supra 
note 21, at 581.  
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (2011); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2011). 
57 See generally 1 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF 
PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 37 (Comm. 
Print 1999). 
58 Raskolnikov, supra note 21, at 601. 
59 Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 
351-52 (2005). Logue’s work builds on the Bentham–Becker fine. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace 
& Co. 1931) (1802); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
60 Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 343 (1989). 
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courts revisit their approach to statutory interpretation of those penalties.61 
And many other tax scholars have offered a variety of approaches to reform 
monetary tax penalties.62 While these alternative proposals have enriched 
and advanced the tax compliance scholarship, federal and state governments 
have not adopted them when designing monetary tax penalties.63 
B. Collateral Tax Sanctions 
Tax scholars who have analyzed tax penalties have focused their atten-
tion almost exclusively on the role of monetary tax penalties in promoting 
voluntary compliance. However, noncompliant taxpayers also face a growing 
number of penalties that cause them to forfeit something other than money 
when they engage in certain acts of tax noncompliance. These nonmonetary 
sanctions apply to individuals who commit tax offenses, yet they are applied 
by non-tax agencies at both the federal and state levels. Because these non-
monetary sanctions apply in addition to the monetary tax penalties that 
taxpayers face when they commit tax offenses, the nonmonetary sanctions 
resemble the collateral consequences that convicted individuals face in 
addition to their criminal sentences. Drawing on this concept, I describe 
these nonmonetary sanctions as “collateral tax sanctions.” This Section 
offers a brief description of collateral consequences in the criminal context, 
provides a formal definition of collateral tax sanctions, and offers several 
examples of collateral tax sanctions that have been proposed or applied by 
federal and state non-tax agencies. 
1. Collateral Consequences in the Criminal Context 
Criminal lawyers describe collateral consequences as the indirect penalties, 
restrictions, and legal “disabilities” that an individual faces after being 
 
61 Steve R. Johnson, The Canon that Tax Penalties Should Be Strictly Construed, 3 NEV. L.J. 495 
(2003). 
62 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 637 (1975) (arguing for the adoption of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States’ proposals in Recommendation 75-7); William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax 
Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (proposing a strict-liability penalty system); Mark P. 
Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 453 (2010) (proposing a fault-based penalty); Jay Soled, Third-Party Civil Tax Penalties and 
Professional Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611 (proposing that the civil tax penalty structure for 
third parties be reformed to mirror the three-tier civil tax penalty structure that applies to all 
taxpayers). 
63 See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 523, 573-80 (discussing “[t]he disconnect between the optimal tax theory and the actual tax 
system”). 
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formally sanctioned for committing a criminal offense.64 Regardless of the 
specific type, collateral consequences apply on top of the formal sanction 
that an offender receives after being convicted. 
The most common examples of collateral consequences stem from crim-
inal convictions.65 The federal government alone revokes dozens of benefits 
and opportunities from individuals who are convicted of certain felony and 
misdemeanor offenses.66 For example, when an individual is convicted of a 
felony drug offense, he may receive a prison sentence (a formal sanction), 
but upon release from prison, he may also be denied admission to public 
housing (a collateral consequence).67 And as a result of federal rules and 
regulations, he may also, for varying periods of time, forfeit the ability to 
serve on a federal grand or petit jury,68 hold a passport,69 enlist in any 
branch of the military,70 receive a commercial motor vehicle license,71 serve 
in certain leadership roles in a labor organization,72 work as a federal law 
enforcement officer,73 register as a commodities dealer,74 work for a hospice 
without undergoing a criminal background check,75 serve as a foster or 
adoptive parent,76 qualify for certain federal higher education grants or 
loans,77 receive federal benefits,78 and obtain or sell firearms,79 among many 
other consequences.80 State agencies may also impose their own additional 
restrictions upon an individual convicted of a federal drug offense, such as 
by suspending his driver’s license.81  
 
64 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
UPON CONVICTION (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf. 
65 See id. at 1-12 (discussing the collateral consequences of convictions of federal crimes). 
66 Id.  
67 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a) (2006). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2006). 
69 22 U.S.C. § 2714 (2012). 
70 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012). 
71 49 U.S.C. § 31310 (2006). 
72 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006). 
73 5 U.S.C. § 7371 (2012). 
74 46 U.S.C. § 7503(b)(1) (2006). 
75 42 C.F.R. § 418.114(d)(1) (2013). 
76 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
77 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012). 
78 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012). 
79 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
80 For a comprehensive list of collateral consequences, see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON 
EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS & THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., INTER-
NAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS IN FEDERAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS (2009), available at http://www.pdsdc.org/Resources/Publication/Collateral%20 
Consequences%20of%20Conviction%20in%20Federal%20Laws%20and%20Regulations.pdf. 
81 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013) (insti-
tuting a six-month suspension on licenses of drivers convicted of a drug-related offense). 
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Many commentators have argued that the proliferation of collateral con-
sequences to felonies and misdemeanors should be reconsidered.82 The 
consensus is that the accumulation of collateral consequences that apply 
under current federal and state law is detrimental to convicted individuals, 
their families, and the rest of society.83 Government officials, advocacy 
groups, and scholars have proposed a range of reforms to the criminal 
justice system that endeavor to reduce the adverse effects of collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions.84 
2. Collateral Tax Sanctions Defined 
The discussion of collateral consequences has centered entirely on the 
extrajudicial effects of convictions for felony criminal offenses such as drug 
possession and distribution, illegal weapons possession, robbery, rape, 
 
82 See supra note 10. 
83 The primary objections of those who oppose the current state of collateral consequences 
can be grouped into two overarching categories. The first principle objection is that these 
consequences present an unjustifiable obstacle for convicted individuals seeking reentry into the 
community following their convictions. Critics argue that, by preventing certain convicted 
individuals from residing in public housing or participating in civic engagement (such as voting or 
serving on juries), collateral consequences alienate those individuals from others. See, e.g., Deborah 
N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeco-
nomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 544-45 (2006) (illustrating 
the cumulative burdens of collateral consequences that prevent ex-offenders from obtaining an 
education, earning a living, or finding a stable home); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the 
Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 273 (2004) (“These social exclusions 
. . . quite effectively relegate ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society, stigmatizing them 
and further highlighting their separation from law-abiding members of society.”).  
The second principle objection is that defendants lack adequate notice of collateral conse-
quences when entering into plea agreements with prosecutors. Many commentators have noted 
that discussion of the potential collateral consequences rarely occurs among defendants, their 
lawyers, and prosecutors before defendants enter a guilty plea. See, e.g., Pinard & Thompson, supra 
note 10, at 590-93 (“Currently, court rules do not require that either a trial judge or defense 
attorney explain the collateral consequences of a guilty plea to the defendant.”); Priscilla Budeiri, 
Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 190-91 (1981) (explaining that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure has been read to not require that a defendant be informed of the collateral consequences 
of pleading guilty).  
84 For example, during his 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush pro-
posed, and Congress subsequently enacted, the allocation of $300 million in federal grants to 
organizations that provide employment assistance, substance abuse treatment, or housing to 
individuals upon their release from incarceration. President George W. Bush, State of the Union 
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Jan. 20, 2004), in H. DOC. NO. 108-44, at 9 (Jan. 
23, 2005). On April 9, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Second Chance Act of 2007, 
which authorized grants to government agencies and nonprofit groups to provide reentry 
assistance to convicted individuals. Pub. L. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 17501 (Supp. V 2012)).  
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assault, and other violent crimes. Yet, collateral consequences occur in other 
legal settings, including tax noncompliance. The imposition of collateral 
sanctions for tax noncompliance has begun to grow in recent years under 
federal, state, and local law.  
Collateral tax sanctions are additional penalties that occur outside of the 
tax system. For example, imagine that if you failed to pay your taxes on 
time, your local board of elections would prohibit you from voting in any 
federal, state, or local election.85 In this hypothetical, when you eventually 
pay your tax liability, you will likely owe a formal tax penalty in the form of 
a delinquency tax penalty. But, in addition to this formal tax penalty, you 
will also face a collateral tax sanction because you will forfeit your right to 
vote.  
Collateral tax sanctions, as I define them, possess three primary charac-
teristics: (1) they rescind or deny a government benefit or privilege from a 
noncompliant taxpayer rather than require the noncompliant taxpayer to 
pay money to the government; (2) they are enforced by an agency other 
than the taxing authority; and (3) they apply in addition to the formal tax 
penalty, typically a monetary tax penalty, that a taxpayer incurs as a result of 
his tax offense. These characteristics mirror the features of nearly all of the 
non-tax collateral consequences described above, such as restrictions on the 
right of certain convicted individuals to serve on juries or qualify for public 
housing. Applying this definition to the voting example, the revocation of 
the right to vote as a result of an outstanding state tax bill is a collateral tax 
sanction because it (1) revokes a government benefit, the right to vote, 
rather than imposing a monetary penalty; (2) applies in addition to the tax 
delinquency penalty, a formal tax penalty; and (3) results from an action by 
the board of elections, a government agency other than the taxing authority. 
Collateral tax sanctions are akin to tax expenditures, except that they 
operate in reverse. Tax expenditures refer to tax credits, deductions, exemp-
tions, and other mechanisms that the taxing authority administers in order 
to achieve a non-tax-revenue-related, public policy objective. 86  As one 
example out of many,87 the federal government encourages individuals to 
 
85 The deprivation of voting rights may raise constitutional concerns. See Hill v. Stone, 421 
U.S. 289, 300 (1975) (striking down a restriction of the franchise to only those who had submitted 
their property for taxation); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969) (striking down a 
requirement that voters in a general bond election be “property taxpayers”). 
86 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) (“[Tax 
incentives or subsidies] represent government spending for favored activities or groups, effected 
through the tax system rather than direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.”). 
87 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT PERFOR-
MANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL 
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support charities by allowing tax-deductible contributions to a number of 
qualifying charitable organizations.88 The IRS must monitor these deduc-
tions to ensure that they comply with the relevant statutory provisions. 
Collateral tax sanctions, by contrast, require agencies other than the taxing 
authority, such as the board of elections in the example above, to participate 
in tax enforcement by rescinding or denying a government benefit as a 
result of an individual’s tax noncompliance. 
3. Examples 
With this definition in hand, it is possible to identify collateral tax sanc-
tions. Below are several illustrations of collateral tax sanctions that have 
been proposed or enacted by the federal government and by state and local 
governments.  
a. Federal Examples  
i. Passports  
Each year, the U.S. Department of State issues hundreds of thousands 
of passports to U.S. citizens who, collectively, owe the federal government 
billions of dollars in unpaid taxes.89 In 2012, the U.S. Senate passed a 
measure designed to encourage tax-delinquent individuals to pay their 
outstanding tax bills.90 Under the legislation, the State Department would 
be required to deny a request for a new passport or renewal of an existing 
passport from any individual owing more than $50,000 in “seriously 
delinquent” tax debt—tax debt for which the IRS has filed a notice of 
federal tax lien.91 Additionally, the State Department would be authorized 
to revoke the outstanding passport of any individual owing this amount of 
tax who attempts to reenter the United States.92  
The announcement of the passport denial proposal generated heated 
public debate. Opponents argued that denying passports to tax-delinquent 
individuals would violate due process rights by restricting an individual’s 
 
COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 4 (2005) (“Between 1974 and 2004, tax 
expenditures doubled in number from 67 to 146 . . . .”). 
88 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006). 
89 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-272, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION: 
POTENTIAL FOR USING PASSPORT ISSUANCE TO INCREASE COLLECTION OF UNPAID 
TAXES 4 (2011) (noting that, as of September 2008, the State Department had issued passports to 
224,000 individuals who collectively owed $5.8 billion in unpaid taxes).  
90 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, S. 1813, 112th Cong., § 40304 (2012). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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ability to travel based on a nonjudicial determination of tax liability.93 
Sponsors of the legislation estimated that, if enacted, the proposal would 
raise over $740 million in tax revenue over a ten-year period.94 While the 
passport denial provision was passed by the U.S. Senate in 2012, it has not 
been adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives.95 
ii. Residency 
In Kawashima v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed another col-
lateral tax sanction with significant implications for lawful permanent 
residents in the United States who may have engaged in certain abusive tax 
activities. Two lawful permanent residents, Akio and Fusako Kawashima, 
failed to pay nearly $250,000 in taxes attributable to their Japanese restau-
rants.96 In 1997, Mr. Kawashima pleaded guilty to willfully filing a false tax 
return, a felony under section 7206(1) of the IRC.97  Mrs. Kawashima 
pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting the preparation of a false tax return 
under section 7206(2) of the IRC.98 In addition to civil tax penalties, the 
Kawashimas each received a four-month prison sentence.99 Mr. Kawashima 
additionally received one year of supervised release.100  
In August 2000, three years after entering their guilty pleas and serving 
their prison sentences, federal immigration officials determined that the 
Kawashimas should be deported back to Japan as a result of committing an 
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.101 Specifi-
cally, the statute provides that an aggravated felony includes an offense that 
“(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 
exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax 
evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.”102 
 
93 See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Forget Travel If You Owe the IRS, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/04/07/forget-travel-if-you-owe-the-irs (noting that 
the “idea seems pretty extreme” and has been attacked as “potentially unconstitutional”). 
94 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus Unveils Chairman’s Mark to Fund 
Highway Bill, Create Infrastructure Jobs (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.finance.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/chairman/release/?id=4f035bc1-14e2-4bea-8d0b-7e578fa5bfbc. 
95 The measure was reintroduced in the U.S. Senate on July 30, 2012, but as of the date of 
publication of this Article, has not been enacted. See Veterans Jobs Corps Act of 2012, S. 3457, 
112th Cong. (2012) (proposing grant of power to the Secretary of State for “action with respect to 
denial, revocation, or limitation of passports”). 
96 Brief for Respondent at 5, Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 10-577). 
97 Id. at 5-6. 
98 Id. at 6. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 7-8. 
102 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)-(ii) (2012).  
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While the Kawashimas did not plead guilty to tax evasion under section 
7201 of the IRC,103 the immigration authorities held that they had commit-
ted an act involving fraud or deceit which imposed a loss of more than 
$10,000 on a “victim”—the federal government itself—because they willfully 
filed false tax returns.104  
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Kawashimas’ deportation in a 6–3 
decision in 2012, holding that the willful filing of a false tax return neces-
sarily involves “fraud or deceit” under the aggravated felony statute.105 
Whether the federal immigration authorities will expand the use of the 
collateral tax sanction of deportation following this decision remains to be seen. 
iii. Housing Assistance  
Since the Great Depression, low-income individuals have received access 
to funds to purchase a home by obtaining a mortgage that is insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA).106 Unlike conventional mortgages, 
an FHA-insured loan is a low-payment obligation that requires a very low 
down payment from the borrower.107 This federal program has offered 
housing assistance to millions of Americans. Under current law, however, if 
an individual is delinquent in paying any federal taxes or has been subject to 
a tax lien by the federal government, the individual may not participate in 
the FHA loan program until entering into a written repayment plan with 
the IRS.108 Denial of this federal benefit applies in addition to any formal 
tax penalties and is applied by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. The proliferation of third-party advisors who specialize in 
helping FHA loan applicants enter into tax repayment programs and 
petition to have tax liens removed indicates the effectiveness of this collat-
eral tax sanction.109 
 
103 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 4.  
104 Id. at 4-5 
105 Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1173 (2012). 
106 Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/ 
hudportal/HUD?src=/buying/loans (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
107 Id. 
108 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-592, TAX DEBTORS HAVE RE-
CEIVED FHA MORTGAGE INSURANCE AND FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYER CREDITS 11-12 
(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591174.pdf. Following the publication of this 
report, the Department of Housing and Urban Development committed to develop a policy with 
the IRS to ensure that it would properly identify tax delinquents. Id. at 27. 
109 See, e.g., Dan Green, FHA Mortgages: Common Questions from Borrowers with Bad Credit, 
MORTGAGE REPORTS (June 9, 2013), http://themortgagereports.com/11633/fha-mortgages-qa-
for-borrowers-with-derogatory-credit; Frequently Asked Questions About the FHA Loan Program, 
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iv. Government Contracts and Employment  
Individuals and businesses that desire to enter into valuable contracts 
with the federal government may be prevented from doing so if they have 
failed to comply with certain tax rules. In 2011, the Government Accounta-
bility Office revealed that 3700 federal contractors who received economic 
stimulus funds during the Obama Administration collectively owed nearly 
$760 million in outstanding federal tax liabilities.110 In response, Congress 
enacted legislation that bars the award of a government contract worth more 
than $5 million unless the service provider can certify that it has filed all 
federal tax returns during the prior three years, has not been convicted of a 
tax crime, and does not owe any outstanding federal tax debt.111  
In addition, in 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives passed legisla-
tion that would deny federal employment to tax-delinquent individuals. 
Under the legislation, all federal agencies would be required to deny 
employment to any individual with a “serious” federal tax delinquency and 
to terminate any existing federal employee who is “seriously” tax delin-
quent.112 The legislation defines tax delinquency as serious whenever the 
IRS has filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien with respect to the tax debt, 
regardless of the amount of the obligation.113 As the sponsor of this legisla-
tion has explained, “Employees who consciously ignore the channels and 
processes in place to fulfill their tax obligations must be held accounta-
ble.”114 This provision was not passed by Congress, but despite the failure to 
enact, third-party attorneys have already offered advice to federal employees 
 
LIFESTYLE MORTGAGE.COM, http://www.lifestyle-mortgage.com/fha/faq.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2014) (providing advice to those with federal tax liens). 
110 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-485, THOUSANDS OF RECOVERY 
ACT CONTRACT AND GRANT RECIPIENTS OWE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS IN FEDERAL 
TAXES 7 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317844.pdf. 
111 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, § 527, Pub. L. No. 112-
55, 125 Stat 636 (2011).  
112 The Federal Employee Tax Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 828, 112th Cong., § 2(a) 
(2012).  
113 Id. 
114 Press Release, Chaffetz Sponsored Federal Employee Tax Accountability Act Passes House 
( July 31, 2012), http://chaffetz.house.gov/press-release/chaffetz-sponsored-federal-employee-tax- 
accountability-act-passes-house (quoting Congressman Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah)); see also Richard 
Simon, House Votes to Fire Tax-Delinquent Federal Workers, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/01/nation/la-na-pn-house-vote-tax-delinquents-20120731 
(noting the views of both proponents and opponents). 
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regarding ways in which they could enter into repayment programs and 
offers-in-compromise to avoid the collateral tax sanction of job termination.115  
b. State and Local Examples 
i. Driver’s Licenses and Vehicle Registration 
Several states have created policies that revoke one of the most signifi-
cant state benefits—the license to drive. In 2011, California enacted legislation 
that requires the Franchise Tax Board to make available a list of the five 
hundred taxpayers who owe the most in income taxes and the five hundred 
taxpayers who owe the most in sales and use taxes.116 The Department of 
Motor Vehicles can suspend the licenses of those appearing on that list; the 
license suspension remains in effect until the taxpayer has made arrange-
ments to satisfy the outstanding tax liability.117 Other states that also revoke 
tax-delinquent residents’ driver’s licenses and/or vehicle registration include 
New York, 118  Massachusetts, 119  Maryland 120  and South Carolina. 121  The 
collateral tax sanction of revoking driver’s licenses from tax-delinquent 
individuals has flourished because states have found that it is effective. For 
example, when New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced in 2013 that 
New York would adopt the measure, his office estimated that it would raise 
over $26 million in tax collections in a single year.122 
Similarly, several states deny vehicle-registration renewal to individuals 
who are delinquent in paying a variety of state and local taxes.123 For 
 
115 See, e.g., Eileen Ambrose, Lawmakers Aim Crackdown on Federally Employed Tax Scofflaws, 
BALT. SUN (Sept. 14, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-14/news/bs-md-federal-tax-
scofflaws-20120912_1_tax-scofflaws-tax-gap-federal-taxes. 
116 CAL. REV. & TAX §§ 7063, 19195 (2012). 
117 CAL. VEH. CODE § 34623.1 (2012); see also Nannette Miranda, Perea Targets Delinquent 
Taxpayers’ Licenses to Drive, ABC LOCAL KSFN (June 8, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story? 
section=news/state&id=8179463 (reporting on the implementation of California’s collateral 
enforcement policy). 
118 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 510(4-a), 511(7) (2001). 
119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60A, § 2A (2012). 
120 MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 13-406 (LexisNexis 2012) (preventing vehicle registration 
if not all fees are paid). 
121 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-2740 (West, Westlaw 2013 through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (suspend-
ing the driver’s license of an individual who fails to pay the personal property tax on their vehicle). 
122 Press Release, Office of the Governor of N.Y., Governor Cuomo Announces Initiative to 
Suspend Driver Licenses of Tax Delinquents Who Owe More than $10,000 in Back Taxes (Aug. 5, 
2013), http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/08052013Tax-Delinquents. 
123 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT., § 14-33 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-3-6 (2006); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-2740 (suspending the vehicle registration of an individual who fails to 
pay the personal property tax on their vehicle). 
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example, many municipalities in Rhode Island impose an annual “car tax” 
based on the value of automobiles owned by residents.124 If an individual is 
delinquent in paying the car tax on any of his cars, the Rhode Island 
Department of Motor Vehicles blocks the renewal of vehicle registration for 
all cars that he owns.125 Not only does the individual owe the original car tax 
and formal delinquency tax penalties, but the individual may also lose the 
use of the car that was subject to the tax and any other cars that he owns as 
well.126  
ii. Professional Licenses 
Many states condition the grants of various professional licenses held by 
individuals and businesses on compliance with state and even federal tax 
laws. Like all collateral tax sanctions, they revoke a government benefit—
the license to engage in a particular profession—in addition to formal tax 
penalties that may result from tax noncompliance. Physicians and lawyers 
are often subject to such scrutiny by licensing boards. 
When considering whether to grant or renew medical licenses, state 
medical licensing boards often consider tax compliance as a factor relevant 
to the question of whether a physician possesses sufficient moral character 
to uphold professional standards. In Minnesota, for instance, if the state 
taxing authority informs the medical licensing board that a physician is 
delinquent in paying taxes, civil tax penalties, or interest, or has simply 
failed to file tax returns at all, the medical licensing board may deny or 
suspend the physician’s license.127  
In the same vein, many state bars might consider certain instances of tax 
noncompliance to be acts of “moral turpitude” that may justify denial or 
 
124 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-3-6 (2006). 
125 Id.  
126 In 2010, Rhode Island reduced the exemption for the car tax, causing thousands of Rhode 
Island residents to receive notices from the Department of Motor Vehicles threatening the denial 
of vehicle registration for all of their cars. See Ted Nesi, Nearly Half of RI Communities Eliminate 
Car Tax Exemption, WPRI.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), http://blogs.wpri.com/2011/08/16/nearly-half-of-
ri-communities-eliminate-car-tax-exemption (discussing how Rhode Island reduced the exemption 
for the car tax, prompting the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue notices threatening to deny 
vehicle registration to thousands of Rhode Island residents, for all of their cars). 
127 See MINN. STAT. § 270C.72 (2012) (mandating the revocation of an individual’s medical 
license if he owes taxes, penalties, or interest and the taxing authority notifies the medical 
licensing board); MO. REV. STAT. § 324.010 (2012) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3113(f ) 
(West, Westlaw through 2013–2014 General Assemb. First Sess.) (same). For further discussion, 
see Arthur H. Coleman, Suspension of Medical License for Tax Evasion, 55 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 
255 (1963). 
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suspension of a license to practice law.128 For example, in 2011, a prominent 
New York attorney pleaded guilty to two counts of failing to file U.S. 
income tax returns for 2004 and 2006 and two counts of willfully failing to 
pay income taxes in 2005 and 2007.129 He paid formal tax penalties and was 
sentenced to twenty-eight months’ incarceration, followed by one year of 
supervised release.130 In addition to incurring these formal tax penalties, the 
disciplinary committee of the New York Bar suspended the attorney’s law 
license, even though his willful failure to file tax returns was a misdemeanor 
offense and involved federal, not state, tax returns.131 
iii. Liquor Licenses  
When restaurant owners fail to pay established tax liability, the state 
agency responsible for issuing liquor licenses may suspend the restaurant’s 
license to serve alcoholic beverages to customers.132 The responsible agency 
often publicly posts a notice of suspension or revocation of a restaurant’s 
liquor license at the entrance of the restaurant.133 As a result of this sanc-
tion, not only will the restaurant owner face formal tax penalties for his 
failure to pay outstanding tax liabilities, but, without a liquor license, the 
restaurant may also lose significant business income.134 
iv. Recreational Licenses  
Several states and municipalities suspend recreational and entertainment 
licenses—such as hunting and fishing licenses—of individuals who are 
delinquent in paying state and local taxes. 
 
128 See, e.g., RULES OF PROC. OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., tit. IV, std. 1.4(c)(ii) (revok-
ing law license for acts of moral turpitude, including failure to pay taxes). 
129 Matter of O’Brien, 946 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 2012). 
130 Id. at 2. 
131 Id. at 3. 
132 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 270C.725 (2012) (describing how all businesses with licenses to 
sell liquor, beer, or wine must be placed on a tax delinquency list if they owe state taxes). 
133 See, e.g., Angela Swartz, Cafe Is Left Dry Following Liquor License Suspension, CAL. AGGIE 
(Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.theaggie.org/2011/11/14/cafe-is-left-dry-following-liquor-license-suspension 
(discussing how the California Department of Alcohol Beverage Control posted a “Notice of 
Suspension” sign in the window of 3rd & U Cafe, located near the University of California-Davis 
campus, because the restaurant owners owed outstanding tax liability). 
134 As one disappointed student commented in response to the closing of the 3rd & U Cafe, 
“For me it sucks . . . . Alcohol is a huge part of their business.” Id. 
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Whether the target is deer, bass, or even alligators,135 recreational hunt-
ing and fishing in Louisiana—the “Sportsman’s Paradise” 136 —is often 
described as a “way of life.”137 Since 2004, however, if a Louisiana resident 
owes over $500 in state taxes, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries will suspend all hunting and fishing licenses held by that individu-
al and will deny requests for renewal until the individual has satisfied the 
outstanding tax liability.138 Despite initial controversy over the measure, 
Louisiana state officials have reported that this license suspension program 
has significantly enhanced its ability to settle outstanding tax debts.139 
Finally, some state and local governments have barred tax noncompliant 
individuals from participating in entertainment activities. In Minnesota, the 
annual state fair boasts attendance rates that are among the highest of such 
events in the United States.140 In keeping with its description as the “Great 
Minnesota Get-Together”,141 the fair includes carnival rides and live mu-
sic142 in addition to educational booths, such as one offering attendees the 
opportunity to “milk” a fiberglass cow143 or witness a live animal birth.144 
While the state fair is an annual community ritual, if an individual owes 
 
135 See LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, ALLIGATOR HUNTING LICENSE APPLI-
CATION FORM, available at http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/wildlife/alligator-hunting (follow 
“Hunter Application” link). 
136  This slogan appears on Louisiana license plates. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47:463A(3)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (directing the Secretary of the 
Department of Public Safety and Corrections to issue to all pick-up trucks license plates 
containing the slogan). 
137 James A. Robichaux, Gator Hunting Is Way of Life for Some, STMARYNOW (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.banner-tribune.com/gator-hunting-way-life-some (discussing the cultural prominence 
of alligator hunting). 
138 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:296.3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
139 See Suspension, Revocation, Denial of Licenses Now in Effect, TAX TOPICS, Apr. 2004, at 1 
(describing the initial results of the hunting license revocation program). 
140 See State Fair-Goers Get on the Stick, Nearly Set Attendance Record in 2012, STARTRIBUNE 
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/local/168479726.html (noting that the twelve-day fair 
drew 1.78 million individuals in 2012).  
141 The Great Minnesota Get-Together (Minnesota State Fair), LIBR. CONGRESS, http:// 
lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/legacies/MN/200003190.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
142 2012 Adventure Park, Attractions & More, MINN. ST. FAIR, http://www.mnstatefair.org/ 
entertainment/adventure_park.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
143  Little Farm Hands, MINN. ST. FAIR, http://www.mnstatefair.org/entertainment/ag_ 
exhibits/lfh.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
144 See 2013 CHS Miracle of Birth Center, MINN. ST. FAIR, http://www.mnstatefair.org/ 
entertainment/ag_exhibits/chs_mob.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (describing the exhibit as the 
“birthplace of nearly 200 calves, lambs, goats and piglets during the 12 days of the Minnesota State 
Fair”). 
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more than $500 in Minnesota state taxes or has not filed state tax returns, he 
will not be permitted to operate a concession, ride, or booth at the fair.145 
C. Unanswered Questions 
As this discussion reveals, both the federal and state governments have 
started to apply collateral tax sanctions by suspending numerous govern-
ment benefits and services from taxpayers who have failed to follow the tax 
law, especially in the aftermath of the recent economic downturn. Yet, even 
if we accept that the collateral tax sanctions described above have resulted, 
or are expected to result, in more effective tax collection than the use of 
traditional monetary tax penalties alone, this new form of tax penalty raises 
several unanswered questions. 
First, why do collateral tax sanctions encourage noncompliant taxpayers, 
particularly those who are delinquent in paying outstanding tax liability, to 
comply where using monetary tax penalties failed? While the media has 
shined some light on the use of collateral tax sanctions, no scholar has 
analyzed the reasons why these sanctions are effective, either by considering 
their behavioral effects or performing original experimental research. 
Scholars of tax compliance, who have devoted significant attention to the 
relationship between monetary tax penalties and tax compliance,146 should 
also seek to develop an understanding of the effect of collateral tax sanctions 
on individual taxpayer compliance.  
Second, why have legislators largely restricted the use of collateral tax 
sanctions to the offense of tax delinquency as opposed to other tax offenses? 
Federal and state collateral tax sanctions that apply today focus almost 
exclusively on a taxpayer’s failure to pay established outstanding tax liabil-
ity. In some cases, such as the proposed legislation that revokes passports 
from tax delinquent individuals, the collateral tax sanction will not apply to 
the taxpayer unless the IRS has filed a lien against the taxpayer’s property.147 
Is it possible that collateral tax sanctions could apply effectively to tax 
offenses other than tax delinquency? 
Third, do collateral tax sanctions raise the same fairness concerns as the 
collateral consequences that occur in the criminal context? Criminal law 
scholars have criticized the spread of collateral sanctions, such as rules that 
prevent convicted felons from holding particular types of employment 
 
145 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270C.72, subd. 2(c) (West 2012). 
146 See supra Section I.A.  (analyzing theories and practical implications of tax penalty provisions). 
147 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 40304 (2012). 
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following the completion of their prison sentences.148 They have argued that 
collateral consequences apply without adequate notice to the defendants149 
and even represent a form of double jeopardy.150 Do collateral tax sanctions, 
such as state rules that revoke tax delinquents’ driver’s licenses, raise these 
fairness concerns as well? If so, what is the effect on taxpayer behavior and 
how might governments redesign offending collateral tax sanctions to 
alleviate the concerns?  
Fourth, why have taxing authorities, such as the IRS and state depart-
ments of revenue, not publicized the existence of collateral tax sanctions? At 
the federal level, for example, neither the IRS website nor the tax forms 
that individuals complete every April contain information about the possi-
bility that certain types of tax noncompliance may result in deportation 
from the United States for noncitizens. They also fail to explain that 
noncompliance may result in the suspension of medical or law licenses by 
state licensing agencies.151 Further, surveys of taxpayer attitudes do not 
reveal collateral tax sanctions as one of the motivations for why individuals 
file their tax returns each year.152 There may be reasons for the lack of 
publicity of collateral tax sanctions by taxing authorities, but they have not 
been articulated thus far. 
These are just a few of the many questions that the rise of collateral tax 
sanctions provokes. The remainder of this Article addresses these questions 
and others as it investigates the proper role and scope of collateral tax 
sanctions as a means of tax enforcement. 
II. WHY COLLATERAL TAX SANCTIONS  
PROMOTE COMPLIANCE 
As the previous discussion illustrates, several states and the federal gov-
ernment are actively considering the use of collateral tax sanctions as a 
result of their apparent effectiveness at combating tax delinquency.153 State 
officials have reported that collateral tax sanctions that are currently in 
effect, such as measures that revoke driver’s licenses, have resulted in 
 
148 See supra note 83 (discussing the need to provide ex-offenders genuine, full citizenship 
upon reentry, including socioeconomic rights that decrease the burden on ex-offenders and their 
families). 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See IRS, FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2013, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ 
i1040.pdf. 
152 See, e.g., IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2011 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 5 (2012), http:// 
www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2012/IRSOB~Taxpayer%20Attitude%20survey%202012.pdf. 
153 See supra subsection I.B.3.b. 
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significant tax collections.154 Federal measures that are pending legislative 
approval, such as the proposed revocation of passports from tax delinquents, 
are projected to enable the government to collect hundreds of millions of 
dollars in outstanding taxes.155 Despite the growing popularity of collateral 
tax sanctions among federal and state government officials, sponsors of 
these sanctions have yet to offer a coherent theoretical or empirical basis to 
explain why collateral tax sanctions appear to encourage noncompliant 
taxpayers to pay taxes owed where traditional monetary tax penalties had 
failed to provoke this response. Before we can determine whether govern-
ments should deploy collateral tax sanctions, and in what contexts, we must 
examine possible reasons for their apparent effectiveness. 
In this Part, I argue that collateral tax sanctions possess features that 
traditional monetary tax penalties lack and that these unique features are 
likely to cause collateral tax sanctions to be more effective than traditional 
monetary tax penalties. In situations where taxpayers have failed to respond 
to monetary tax penalties resulting from their tax noncompliance, collateral 
tax sanctions, whether they involve the revocation of a recreational or 
professional license, are more likely to induce compliance. In making this 
claim, I consider behavioral and experimental research in the tax compliance 
and other related contexts. While this Article does not present the results of 
original experimental research, future studies could examine the effects of 
specific types of collateral tax sanctions on taxpayers who possess particular 
characteristics. After presenting arguments for why collateral tax sanctions 
offer tax enforcement benefits that traditional monetary tax penalties do 
not, I consider whether and how collateral tax sanctions should be applied to 
tax offenses other than tax delinquency. 
A. Why Do People Pay Taxes? 
In the United States, most people pay their taxes. According to the latest 
statistics released by the federal government, approximately 83% of all tax 
dollars owed to the federal government is paid correctly and in a timely 
manner each year.156 In light of the complexity of the federal tax law and its 
reliance on individual taxpayers to correctly self-assess and report income, 
 
154 Id. 
155 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
156 IRS, TAX YEAR 2006 TAX GAP ESTIMATE—SUMMARY OF ESTIMATION METHODS 
1 (2012), available at www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/summary_of_methods_tax_gap_2006.pdf (noting 
a voluntary compliance rate of 83.1% in 2006). 
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government officials, commentators, and scholars have lauded this compli-
ance rate as high.157 
The other side of the voluntary compliance coin is the gross federal tax 
gap, which is the amount of true tax liability that is not paid on time each 
year. According to the most recent government reports, this amount is $450 
billion, or approximately 17% of federal taxes owed.158 Noncompliance by 
individual taxpayers (as opposed to corporations or other entities) repre-
sents the largest component ($296 billion) of the gross federal tax gap.159 
And within the federal tax gap, certain forms of tax compliance occur at 
levels far lower than the overall voluntary compliance rate, such as reporting 
of income by small business owners who are not subject to information 
reporting or withholding.160  
There is no single answer to the question of why some individuals com-
ply with the tax law while others do not.161 Over the past several decades, 
legal scholars and economists have offered a number of theories to explain 
why individual taxpayers are motivated to comply with the tax law—reasons 
other than rules that require mandatory withholding of tax liability by third 
parties. Some of the most prominent of these possible motivations of 
compliance include fear of sanctions, 162  the perception that others are 
reciprocating one’s tax compliance,163 a desire to avoid the negative signal of 
 
157 See, e.g., IRS, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf (“The overall compliance rate achieved 
under the United States revenue system is quite high.”); Doran, supra note 21, at 123 (characteriz-
ing the federal taxpayer compliance rate of approximately 85% as “robust”). 
158  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOURCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE AND 
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE IT 4 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590215.pdf. 
159 Id.  
160 Only 44% of income that is subject to little or no information reporting, such as cash 
income, rents, royalties, and farm income, is properly reported and paid to the federal government 
each year. Id. at 6 fig.1. By contrast, 99% of income that is subject to third-party information 
reporting and withholding rules, such as wages, is properly reported and paid. Id.  
161 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Introduction to WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992) (discussing why it is important that tax 
policymakers know what drives tax compliance and how that information can be supplied by cross-
disciplinary literature). 
162 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 209 (1968); Raskolnikov, supra note 21, at 571 (describing deterrence theory). 
163 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of 
Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845, 845-46 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of 
Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71 (2003). 
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tax noncompliance,164 and the belief that payment of taxes is a duty of 
citizenship.165  
In addition to these theories of individual tax compliance, tax scholars 
have observed that cognitive biases and heuristics also influence individuals’ 
decisions.166 As a general matter, these biases cause people to draw incorrect 
conclusions based on memorable events, anchor themselves to initial values, 
overvalue losses, and exhibit other seemingly irrational tendencies. 167 
Several tax scholars have explored the ways that cognitive biases can 
influence individuals’ tax planning and compliance decisions.168 
B. Collateral Tax Sanctions and Motivations of Compliance 
To illustrate the tax administration dilemma that many states and the 
federal government face, consider the following scenario: a wealthy individ-
ual owes the government $400,000 in undisputed state taxes. The individual 
has incurred significant monetary tax penalties and interest as a result of 
this outstanding tax liability. While the taxing authority has attempted to 
contact this individual repeatedly, he simply refuses to respond, let alone 
pay any of his outstanding tax liability. Even after the taxing authority 
obtains liens on the individual’s property, he still refuses to pay. Now the 
state government has a choice. It can continue to apply monetary tax 
penalties against this individual or, alternatively, it can threaten this indi-
vidual with a collateral tax sanction. 
In this Section, I investigate how current collateral tax sanctions by the 
federal and state governments, which primarily have targeted the offense of 
tax delinquency, promote tax compliance among individuals. In conducting 
this analysis, I contrast the use of collateral tax sanctions in addition to 
monetary tax penalties with the exclusive use of monetary tax penalties, 
taking into account the perceived major motivations for tax compliance and 
 
164 See Posner, supra note 26, at 1789 (applying signaling model to tax compliance). 
165 See, e.g., John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income Tax System, 13 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 189 (2003) (describing the empirical support for the duty-of-
citizenship model of tax compliance). 
166 See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 23; McCaffery, supra note 23; Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 23. 
167 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 667 (1999) (describing how economic actors present 
information to exploit individuals’ cognitive biases); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, 
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (arguing that certain product warnings 
exploit individuals’ cognitive biases); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 14-18 (describing the 
availability and anchoring biases). 
168 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 23 (exploring how various cognitive biases affect taxpayer deci-
sions); McCaffery, supra note 23; Schenk, supra note 23. 
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individuals’ well-known cognitive biases. My analysis reveals that collateral 
tax sanctions possess several unique characteristics that make them more 
likely to encourage noncompliant taxpayers, including those such as the 
individual described above, to begin to cooperate with the taxing authority. 
1. Collateral Tax Sanctions Are More Salient than  
Monetary Tax Penalties 
One explanation for the efficacy of collateral tax sanctions as a deterrent 
against continued tax noncompliance is that their features cause them to be 
more salient than traditional monetary penalties. The salience bias generally 
leads individuals to pay greater attention to information that is prominent 
rather than that which is hidden.169 For example, an individual is often more 
affected by witnessing a violent car accident in person than by reading 
anonymous statistics regarding car accidents in the newspaper. Similarly, 
scholars have noted that the effect of a particular tax on an individual’s 
purchasing decisions can increase with the salience of the tax. 170  This 
matters because deterrence theorists posit that some individuals act ration-
ally when deciding whether to engage in tax avoidance or evasion.171 The 
salience of collateral tax sanctions, compared to that of traditional monetary 
tax penalties, likely causes people to assign greater weight to collateral tax 
sanctions than to traditional monetary tax penalties when calculating the 
cost of tax noncompliance.  
When individuals owe monetary tax penalties as a result of their failure 
to report tax liability properly or pay outstanding tax liabilities, they may 
consider the tax penalties as indistinguishable from the overall tax bill. 
Because both tax liability and tax penalties are monetary, they are likely 
fungible in some taxpayers’ minds. The government inadvertently promotes 
 
169 For a general explanation of the salience bias, see Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available?  
Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2003). See also Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 23, at 11 (hypothesizing that salience affects the “retrievability of instances” 
when individuals assess the probability of an event or engage in other cognitive exercises). 
170 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1145, 1145-47 (2009) (finding that the prominence of sales tax information on price tags 
affects consumer purchasing choices); Richard L. Ott & David M. Andrus, The Effect of Personal 
Property Taxes on Consumer Vehicle-Purchasing Decisions: A Partitioned Price/Mental Accounting Theory 
Analysis, 28 PUB. FIN. REV. 134, 149-50 (2000) (finding that individual consumers do not 
properly take into account vehicle property taxes when purchasing automobiles).  
171 See BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 325; Becker, supra note 162, at 176 (“Some persons be-
come ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, 
but because their benefits and costs differ.”); Raskolnikov, supra note 21, at 576 (explaining the 
theory that when “rational utility-maximizers” decide to evade taxes, they take into account the 
expected cost of punishment). 
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this conflation. For example, when describing the collection of delinquent 
taxes, many state and local governments inform their residents that the tax 
assessor collects “taxes, including penalties and interest.”172 Similarly, in its 
instructions to taxpayers regarding installment agreements and offers in 
compromise, the IRS refers to tax liabilities as “taxes, including penalties 
and interest.”173 Taxing authorities therefore describe tax penalties as part of 
the tax liability itself rather than as separate punitive payments. The threat 
of additional monetary penalties is unlikely to be salient enough to motivate 
individuals who have ignored outstanding tax liabilities to comply.  
Tax liens are also not effective collection mechanisms for many taxpayers, 
particularly wealthy individuals. One might ask, for instance, why the 
sanctions proposed by the passport revocation legislation apply only after 
the taxing authority has filed a tax lien against the taxpayer.174 A tax lien 
alerts future purchasers of the taxpayer’s property and the taxpayer’s 
creditors that the government holds a claim against the property.175 Imagine 
that a wealthy individual owns three houses and the IRS (only knowing 
about one of them) files a Notice of Federal Tax Lien only where one of the 
houses is located. The filing of the lien may have no effect on the other two 
houses.176 In addition, if the taxpayer has no plans to sell the house that is 
subject to the tax lien, he may allow the lien to remain without suffering a 
serious consequence.177 Tax liens adversely affect individuals’ credit scores, 
but wealthy individuals may not rely on borrowing from third-party lenders. 
Finally, if the property is already encumbered with mortgages, the IRS 
might not seek to foreclose on a house subject to a tax lien because, after the 
other creditors are satisfied, the IRS would collect little from the foreclosure 
 
172 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 6-1.1-23-1(d) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-1304(1) (2013). 
173 See IRS, FORM 433-D, INSTALLMENT AGREEMENT (2012) (“This agreement will 
remain in effect until your liabilities (including penalties and interest) are paid in full . . . .”); IRS, 
FORM 656 BOOKLET, OFFER IN COMPROMISE 3 (2012) (“If your offer is defaulted, all compro-
mised tax debts, including penalties and interest, will be reinstated.”). 
174 See supra subsection I.B.3.a.i. 
175 See I.R.C. § 6321 (2006); Understanding a Federal Tax Lien, IRS (Nov. 6, 2013), http:// 
www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Understanding-a-Federal-Tax-Lien. 
176 See I.R.C. § 6323(f ) (describing the place for the filing of a tax lien on real property). 
177 See, e.g., Marc Lifsher & Scott Wilson, California Tax Delinquents List Includes Notable 
Names, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/14/business/la-fi-tax-
deadbeats-20120414 (listing millionaires who have ignored multi-million dollar state tax liens 
dating back to 1995).  
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proceedings.178 Indeed, the IRS files millions of tax liens each year without 
recovering the outstanding tax liabilities.179 
Collateral tax sanctions, by contrast, target conspicuous privileges and 
services and, as a result, likely evoke stronger psychological reactions from 
individual taxpayers facing them. Several collateral tax sanctions—such as 
those which cause an individual to lose a driver’s license, forfeit a passport, 
or face deportation hearings—threaten the loss of crucial benefits. In turn, 
proposals of such collateral tax sanctions tend to receive significant publicity. 
For example, the Senate’s 2011 proposal to rescind or deny tax delinquent 
individuals’ passports has been the focus of hundreds of media reports.180 As 
a result, it is possible that individuals have an easier time imagining the 
consequences of losing one of these privileges than simply owing additional 
money.  
In addition to increased publicity, collateral tax sanctions affect salient 
government benefits that individuals value highly. Many of these benefits 
serve a mix of personal and business purposes. For example, a driver’s 
license enables many individuals to drive to work where they can earn a 
paycheck, and to children’s little league baseball games, or to a friend’s 
birthday party. For this reason, many consider the driver’s license to be one 
of the most valuable benefits that they receive from their state govern-
ment.181 As one court noted when considering driving-while-intoxicated 
charges, “The fact remains that today the very livelihood of a man and his 
family may depend upon his [driver’s] license.”182 For some individuals, the 
high personal value of the government benefits at stake likely causes them 
to assign greater weight to collateral tax sanctions than to monetary tax 
penalties, thereby increasing their deterrent effect.  
Last, not only are collateral tax sanctions more salient than monetary tax 
penalties, but they are often administered by government agencies that are 
more salient than the taxing authority. According to the IRS, nearly sixty 
percent of taxpayers in the United States use tax preparers or software to 
file their annual tax returns and do not interact with the IRS beyond 
 
178 See I.R.C. § 7403 (2006) (outlining foreclosure proceedings against properties with gov-
ernment liens). Some preexisting liens on a property may take priority over a tax lien filed by the 
IRS. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 5.17.2.6 (2012). 
179 See IRS, IRS DATA BOOK 2011, 41 (2012) (reporting that 2,138,606 federal tax liens were 
filed in fiscal years 2010 and 2011).  
180 A search on LexisNexis’s ALL News Database for “passport” and “tax” and “deny” and 
“delinquent” between January 1, 2011, and September 24, 2012, yielded 22 different articles. A 
similar Google search yielded 1390 articles. 
181 See, e.g., Bechler v. Parsekian, 176 A.2d 470, 479 (N.J. 1961) (“[I]n today’s society a license 
to operate an automobile may be of vital significance and value to the licensee . . . .”). 
182 Parsekian v. Cresse, 183 A.2d 426, 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962). 
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writing a check.183 Collateral tax sanctions, on the other hand, force individ-
uals to answer for their tax noncompliance directly by facing another 
government agency. Some of these agencies, such as the department of 
motor vehicles, have a reputation for being bound by strict rules and 
procedures.184 For example, in New Jersey, to receive a driver’s license, an 
individual must submit multiple specific identification documents185 and 
even refrain from excessive smiling when being photographed.186 If individ-
uals are aware that they will forfeit a government benefit, such as a driver’s 
license, as a result of tax delinquency or other tax offenses, they might fear 
that the agency that enforces the sanction will be even less flexible than the 
taxing authority in correcting errors or compromising. 
2. Collateral Tax Sanctions Provoke Loss Aversion and the  
Endowment Effect 
Another explanation for why collateral tax sanctions are effective deter-
rents against tax noncompliance compared to additional monetary tax 
penalties is that they trigger loss aversion and the endowment effect, two 
significant, related cognitive biases of individual taxpayers.  
When individuals are forced to choose between two options—one that 
will lead them to gain some item and another that will cause them to lose an 
item they already possess—individuals have difficulty choosing to experi-
ence the loss.187 Their strong distaste for losses leads to the endowment 
effect, which causes them to develop attachments to items they own and a 
reluctance to part with them.188 These two biases lead individuals to resist 
attempts by others to take their property, whether or not they are compensated. 
 
183 See SOI Tax Stats—Tax Stats at a Glance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Tax-
Stats-at-a-Glance (last updated Jan. 24, 2014) (showing that fifty-six percent of individual tax 
returns were filed with assistance from a paid preparer in the 2011 tax year).  
184 See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005, § 202, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 312-15 (2005) (creating 
numerous requirements for identifications issued by state motor vehicles departments). 
185 See, e.g., 6 Point ID Verification, ST. N.J. MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION (Dec. 16, 
2013), http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/Licenses/6PointID.htm (describing that New Jersey citizens 
wishing to obtain a license must pass a “6 Point ID Verification”). 
186 See Harry Bradford, New Jersey Bans Smiling In Driver's License Photos, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/24/new-jersey-bans-smiling-drivers- 
license_n_1909773.html (quoting a Department of Motor Vehicles’ spokesman as stating that the 
Department will “allow small smiles but ‘I-won-the-lottery-type’ grins aren’t acceptable” when 
having a license picture taken). 
187 See Kahneman et al., supra note 24, at 194 (giving an overview of behavioral studies on the 
endowment effect); Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (explaining the role of opportunity costs in the endowment effect). 
188 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 (1990) (describing the 
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Many experiments have demonstrated that individuals are averse to losing 
things they hold. In one of the most famous studies by Daniel Kahneman, 
Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, subjects were told that they were buyers 
or sellers.189 The sellers were given Simon Fraser University coffee mugs, 
and the buyers were not given anything.190 When the buyers were asked to 
state the price at which they would purchase the coffee mug from the 
sellers, they reported an average price of $2.87.191 The sellers, on the other 
hand, reported that they would be willing to sell the very same mugs to the 
buyers for an average price of $7.12.192 In another similar study, subjects 
were told that they would receive coffee mugs and were asked to speculate 
on the price at which they would be willing to sell the mugs.193 The subjects 
then received the actual mugs and were asked the same question.194 Once 
they held the mugs in their hands and “owned” them, they reported an 
average minimum selling price that was significantly higher than their 
original reported price. 195  These and several other similar experiments 
reveal that individuals consider the experience of parting with property to 
be roughly twice as painful as gaining property of the same value.196 
Individuals do not experience loss aversion in all transactions. For some 
individuals, it is possible that traditional monetary tax penalties do not 
induce strong loss aversion or endowment effects, especially if they are not 
applied at very high rates. As the founding researchers in this area have 
stated, “Buyers do not value the money spent on normal purchases as a loss, 
 
“instant endowment effect”, which causes subjects to increase their valuation of certain goods as 
soon as they receive them). 
189 Kahneman et al., supra note 24, at 195-96. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929, 
931-32 (1995). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Kahneman et al., supra note 24, at 199. This result is consistent with prospect theory. See 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263, 278-79 (1979) (explaining that individuals are risk-averse when facing gains 
and risk-seeking when facing losses). Several experiments have demonstrated the applicability of 
prospect theory to individual tax compliance. See, e.g., Henk Elffers & Dick J. Hessing, Influencing 
the Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289, 291 (1997); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, 
Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 
TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/id=2316233 (offering a proposal to 
impose presumptive collection on small business owners that would cause them to expect tax 
refunds); Gideon Yaniv, Tax Compliance and Advance Tax Payments: A Prospect Theory Analysis, 52 
NAT’L TAX J. 753, 761 (1999) (finding that sufficiently high advance tax payments induce 
compliance because individuals are risk-averse when approaching tax refunds). 
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so long as the price of the good is not thought to be unusually high.”197 
Others have stated the same principal using different terms, such as that 
loss aversion does not occur in “routine transactions”198 and that individuals 
do not experience loss aversion when they spend money “as intended.”199 
Applying these findings to taxation, habitually delinquent or otherwise 
noncompliant taxpayers likely do not consider monetary tax penalties as 
significant losses. When an individual deliberately decides not to pay out-
standing taxes on time or fails to pay the appropriate amount of estimated 
federal tax payments each quarter, he usually knows that he will incur 
additional monetary tax penalties and interest.200 These individuals probably 
consider such monetary tax penalties to be like any other payment that they 
intend to make during the year and, as a result, do not change their behavior 
in response to the threat of the monetary tax penalties. 
On the other hand, individuals likely experience greater loss aversion 
when faced with the threat of collateral tax sanctions that would cause them 
to forfeit salient government benefits and services. Collateral tax sanctions 
serve as more effective deterrents than traditional monetary tax penalties 
because many individuals are highly averse to the thought of having to 
sacrifice a license or benefit, such as the right to travel freely, apply for a 
subsidized federal loan, or engage in a recreational activity like hunting or 
fishing. Unlike money that an individual allocates to the payment of monetary 
tax penalties, these government benefits and services can be considered 
“entitlements” in the minds of individual taxpayers, items that are similar to 
any other property they hold. For instance, news reports regarding collateral 
tax sanctions often use the terms “lose” or “forfeit” when discussing these 
sanctions, further stimulating individuals’ loss aversion biases.201  
People also associate personal experiences and even emotional feelings 
with government benefits and privileges that are the subject of collateral tax 
sanctions. For example, some lawyers have significant personal feelings 
regarding their law licenses because they recall the costs, monetary and 
otherwise, of going to law school and taking the bar exam. Of course, this 
 
197 Kahneman et al., supra note 24, at 200 n.3.; see also Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahne-
man, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 119 (2005).  
198 Novemsky & Kahneman, supra note 197, at 119. 
199 Id. (“A key idea is that exchange goods that are given up ‘as intended’ do not exhibit loss 
aversion.”) 
200 See IRS, PUBLICATION 505, TAX WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX 13 (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf (describing estimated tax payment require-
ments and related tax penalties). 
201 See, e.g., State Gets License to Keep Tax Cheats Off Road, BOSTON HER., July 11, 2008 
(“Don’t pay your taxes, and you will lose your driver’s license.”); California to Tax Scofflaws, supra 
note 17. 
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particular license enables lawyers to earn a living. Yet even lawyers who do 
not practice continue to pay annual dues and make annual payments to 
client protection funds because they do not want to forfeit their law licenses.202 
Whether collateral tax sanctions cause lawyers to think about the value of 
their law licenses, individuals to recall their experiences in receiving their 
first driver’s licenses, or noncitizen residents to remember satisfying the 
requirements for a green card, these sanctions can result in strong loss-
aversion effects. For many individuals, these licenses and benefits have a 
personal history, whereas individual dollars used to pay monetary tax 
penalties do not. 
Further, collateral tax sanctions threaten to revoke benefits and services 
that cannot be replaced. An individual can pursue a number of different 
options, such as borrowing or increasing work hours, to replace the dollars 
spent on monetary tax penalties. But unlike monetary instruments, there is 
no private market for items such as passports, driver’s licenses, liquor 
licenses, or many of the other government benefits and services that are the 
subject of collateral tax sanctions. 203  Because individuals cannot spend 
money or engage in other activities to replace those benefits and services if 
they are forced to forfeit them, the loss-aversion and endowment effects of 
collateral tax sanctions cause some people to attempt to avoid losing these 
items. In the face of collateral tax sanctions, the easiest way for individuals to 
avoid revocation of those benefits and services is to comply with the tax law. 
3. Certain Collateral Tax Sanctions Can Impose Greater  
Economic Costs than Monetary Tax Penalties 
While collateral tax sanctions do not impose an explicit monetary fine 
on noncompliant taxpayers, they can still result in indirect economic costs. 
These indirect costs differ significantly from the types of economic costs 
imposed by traditional monetary tax penalties. Particularly with respect to 
wealthy taxpayers, certain collateral tax sanctions have a much greater 
potential ability to approximate the deterrence effects of the classic Ben-
tham–Becker fine (in which the fine equals the harm divided by the proba-
bility that the harm would be detected ex ante) than the monetary tax 
penalties that legislators are typically capable of enacting.204 
 
202 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:28-2(a) (requiring all law license holders in New Jersey to make 
annual contributions to a client protection fund in order to maintain their law licenses). 
203 This statement refers to markets for legal, rather than counterfeit, licenses. 
204 See supra note 13-19 and accompanying text. 
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Monetary tax penalties, whether they are percentage or flat tax penal-
ties,205 are bound by relatively low statutory limits. For example, taxpayers 
are subject to a penalty equal to 0.5% of the net tax shown on the taxpayer’s 
tax return for each month (or fraction of a month) that they fail to timely 
pay their tax liability.206 The total amount of the tax penalty is capped at 
25% of the taxpayer’s tax liability.207 The total amount of this particular tax 
penalty, thus, is limited. Even though the taxpayer will continue to owe 
interest to the federal government as he fails to pay the outstanding liabil-
ity, the interest rate is also subject to a statutory limit.208 Rational taxpayers 
who weigh costs and benefits can easily calculate the economic cost of tax 
penalties. As has been discussed, in most cases, the nominal amounts of 
these penalties are relatively low compared to the tax liability and are even 
lower when a taxpayer discounts them to take into account the probability 
that the taxing authority will be unable to compel payment.209 
By contrast, certain collateral tax sanctions can result in indirect eco-
nomic costs that are greater than most traditional monetary tax penalties. 
For example, a taxpayer who fails to pay an outstanding tax liability and 
consequently forfeits her professional license, such as a medical or law 
license, for a period of time will also lose income unless she attempts to 
practice her profession illegally. Rational taxpayers likely assume that the 
cost of certain collateral tax sanctions, such as loss of a professional license, 
is high. This type of collateral tax sanction would result in lost income 
during the suspension, future lost income from clients who choose other 
providers, and transactional expenses related to seeking reinstatement of the 
license from the non-tax agency. Some rational taxpayers might even 
overvalue the amount of these indirect economic costs compared to the 
simple valuation of explicit monetary tax penalties. One response to the 
question of why collateral tax sanctions promote voluntary compliance more 
effectively than traditional monetary tax penalties, thus, could be that they 
threaten to impose a high and uncertain economic cost on taxpayers that 
outweighs the potential benefits of continued tax noncompliance.  
The indirect economic cost of collateral tax sanctions offers two deter-
rence benefits that traditional monetary tax penalties do not. First, certain 
collateral tax sanctions are more progressive than traditional monetary tax 
penalties in that their indirect economic cost is tied to the individual 
 
205 See supra Section I.A. 
206 I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (2006). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. § 6621(a)(2) (2006) (defining the underpayment rate as the sum of the federal short-
term rate plus three percentage points). 
209 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
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characteristics of the noncompliant taxpayer, particularly the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay. When governments enact monetary tax penalties, they 
attempt, in part, to set the penalty amounts at levels that are significant 
enough to achieve deterrence. But this process only enables the government 
to consider amounts that will achieve general levels of deterrence across the 
population. By imposing economic costs that vary from taxpayer to taxpayer 
depending on their individual characteristics, on the other hand, collateral 
tax sanctions enable the government to create targeted sanctions that 
impose meaningful economic costs on taxpayers with different abilities to pay.  
Consider an example: A monetary tax penalty for filing a frivolous tax 
return under current law is a flat amount of $5000 for every taxpayer, 
regardless of the taxpayer’s personal attributes, such as annual income or 
wealth.210 A collateral tax sanction that revokes a taxpayer’s professional 
license for a similar offense, on the other hand, would impose an economic 
cost that is directly tied to the individual’s income. If the individual who 
incurs this collateral tax sanction is an orthopedic surgeon who earns 
$40,000 a month,211 for example, the revocation of her professional license 
for two months would result in at least $80,000 of lost income. Even if we 
ignore the behavioral effects of collateral tax sanctions described earlier and 
apply the rational-actor model of taxpayer behavior, the collateral tax 
sanction in this example would be more likely to encourage the taxpayer to 
pay than the monetary tax penalty. 
As this illustration shows, certain collateral tax sanctions can impose a 
heavier economic burden on individuals who have a greater ability to pay. In 
this example, the potential indirect economic cost of the collateral tax 
sanction is $80,000 compared to the $5000 economic cost of the monetary 
tax penalty; therefore, the value of the collateral tax sanction is much closer 
to the Bentham–Becker fine than the monetary tax penalty.212 The indirect 
cost of collateral tax sanctions is unique compared to the cost of monetary 
tax penalties—it depends on the taxpayer’s individual characteristics rather 
than on an assumption by the government regarding the level of the penalty 
needed to achieve general deterrence. Where the flat monetary tax penalty 
for filing a frivolous tax return described above applies equally to all 
taxpayers, irrespective of their income or wealth, a collateral tax sanction 
 
210 I.R.C. § 6702(a) (2006). 
211 The national median salary for an orthopedic surgeon was more than $515,000 in 2012. SUL-
LIVAN COTTER & ASSOCS., INC., PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION: WHERE THE MARKET IS GOING 
(2013), available at https://www.eiseverywhere.com/file_uploads/5f5dedc5323d81d666261a4e9a6436bf_ 
2013_AMGA_Presentation_CFO_3-13-13_to_AMGA_Print.pdf. 
212 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. I thank David Schizer and Deborah Schenk for 
helpful discussion of this point. 
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can result in an indirect economic burden that is directly tied to an individual’s 
earning capacity (in the case of loss of a professional license) or choice of 
leisure activities (in the case of loss of a recreational license). The progres-
sive nature of certain collateral tax sanctions, thus, can induce voluntary 
compliance from wealthy taxpayers who do not respond to the threat of 
monetary tax penalties under current law.  
In addition, the indirect economic cost of certain collateral tax sanctions 
can be greater than the maximum value of traditional tax penalties that 
legislators can enact as a political matter. One could reasonably deduce from 
the argument above that the federal and state governments could achieve 
the results of collateral tax sanctions with monetary tax penalties by simply 
increasing the nominal value of the monetary tax penalties by an amount 
equal to the indirect economic costs of the collateral tax sanctions. Legisla-
tors, however, rarely alter the nominal value of monetary tax penalties, in 
part because of the political consequences such action would have.213 As the 
Joint Committee on Taxation reported in 1998, Congress often faces “pressures 
to set enforcement at levels lower than would be most appropriate.”214 One 
reason for the political infeasibility of raising the explicit amounts of 
monetary tax penalties is that legislators do not want to create rules that are 
overly punitive to taxpayers. For example, Congress capped the penalty for 
failure to pay tax liability (to 25% of the tax liability) because of the need to 
“avoid the buildup of financial burdens on delinquent taxpayers to the point 
where such additional burdens act as a barrier to resolution.”215 In contrast, 
many of the collateral tax sanctions described above, such as the revocation 
of driver’s licenses from tax delinquent individuals, have been sponsored by 
legislators of both political parties and have received public support as well.216  
4. Certain Collateral Tax Sanctions Emit Negative Signals 
While collateral tax sanctions deter tax noncompliance by some individ-
uals who respond positively to the threat of penalties and punishment, they 
can also influence the behavior of individuals who fear the negative reputa-
tional signals that the sanctions convey to others. The signaling effect of 
 
213 For a discussion of how setting penalty amounts in an enforcement regime can pose diffi-
cult issues for the government, see 1 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 
57, at 37; Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489, 530 
(2011) (discussing the relative stability of tax penalties). 
214 1 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 36. 
215 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PENALTY AND 
INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 58 (1999), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/intpenal.pdf. 
216 See supra subsection I.B.3. 
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certain collateral tax sanctions is a feature that traditional monetary tax 
penalties typically do not possess. In order to avoid these collateral tax 
sanctions and their accompanying negative reputational signals, some 
individuals would likely feel compelled to properly report and pay their tax 
liabilities. 
Signals are costly actions that individuals undertake in order to provide 
information to other individuals.217 When a professor wears a suit and tie to 
class, he might do so in part to signal to his students that he possesses 
knowledge, professionalism, discipline, or other characteristics. This signal 
provides two types of information: direct information (he is wearing a suit 
and tie) and indirect information (he is professional). According to the 
signaling model, individuals engage in cooperative relationships with other 
individuals that take the form of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma.218 Because 
people want to engage in as many of these cooperative relationships as 
possible, they must find ways to signal to others that they are “good types” 
who will not try to take advantage of them.219 
In the tax context, proponents of the signaling theory, most notably Eric 
Posner, have argued that tax compliance serves as a signal that an individual 
is a good type who can be trusted.220 Conversely, tax noncompliance is a 
signal that an individual will cheat others just as he has cheated the gov-
ernment.221 According to this theory, a possible explanation for high rates of 
voluntary compliance in a self-assessment tax system is that most individu-
als do not want to signal to others that they are bad types.222 
The signaling model as an explanation for why people pay taxes has 
been subject to harsh criticism in both social norms and tax law scholar-
ship.223 The primary objection is that, unlike other types of signals, such as 
wearing suits and ties, acts of tax compliance and noncompliance usually 
cannot be observed by other individuals. 224  Tax return information is 
 
217 See Posner, supra note 26, at 1787. 
218 Id. at 1786-88. 
219 Id. at 1786-90. 
220 Id.  
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 1818-19. 
223 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and 
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (2002) (proposing a theory of “moral and 
emotional” reciprocity as more accurate than Posner’s economic signaling model); Leandra 
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 
1476 n.122 (2003) (“[T]he signaling theory has fundamental problems.”); Richard H. McAdams, 
Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 688 (2001) 
(book review) (criticizing Posner’s model for its failure to examine motivations for signaling).  
224 See Kahan, supra note 223, at 378 (“[W]hether a person is complying with her tax obliga-
tions can’t be observed by members of the public generally.”). 
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specifically protected by taxpayer privacy rules that prevent individuals 
from seeing others’ tax returns, including whether they were audited by the 
taxing authority or required to pay monetary tax penalties.225 Few individu-
als reveal their tax return information voluntarily to others.226 In defending 
his signaling theory, even Eric Posner himself appears to ultimately agree 
that his theory has somewhat limited application to tax compliance.227 
In contrast to traditional monetary tax penalties, which taxpayers pay 
during settlement with the taxing authority behind the curtain of taxpayer 
privacy, certain collateral tax sanctions indeed produce observable negative 
signals. As I describe below, these signals can result in significant adverse 
professional and personal consequences, which effectively deter acts of tax 
noncompliance. 
a. Professional Signals 
Individuals who hold positions of trust, such as lawyers and physicians, 
may fear not only the potential suspensions of their licenses that can result 
from failing to comply with the tax law, but may also fear the reputational 
damage from such suspensions. For example, if a physician’s medical license 
is temporarily suspended for failing to file tax returns for several years, a 
potential patient may learn of the suspension and the underlying offense 
and conclude that he will not be able to trust the physician to reach accurate 
and timely medical treatment decisions. Not only will the physician owe tax 
penalties and interest on her delinquent tax liability—as well as suffer 
financial losses during the period when she cannot practice medicine—but 
also future patients might learn of her medical license suspension. If the 
physician were subject solely to monetary tax penalties, however, it is 
unlikely that the potential patient would ever learn about the tax offenses, 
due to tax-privacy protections. Especially in the online era, once the 
physician’s license is suspended, potential patients can easily discover this 
information through their own research.228 
In addition, collateral tax sanctions can lead some potential clients and 
business associates to incorrectly assume that the sanctioned individual 
committed an act even more serious than tax noncompliance. For example, if 
 
225 I.R.C. § 6103 (a)(b)(2) (2006). 
226 See Kahan, supra note 223, at 379 (“[T]here is in fact no such norm of spontaneous tax 
disclosure in our society.”). 
227 Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 465, 468 (2002) (conceding that tax privacy limits signaling effects).  
228 See, e.g., HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (in-
dexing contact information and user reviews for doctors by geographic location). 
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a lawyer receives a collateral tax sanction for failing to file tax returns and 
loses his law license, a potential client can learn of the suspension but not its 
cause. The client might assume that it was due to any number of offenses 
beyond tax noncompliance, such as commingling a client’s funds with the 
lawyer’s own personal account or even engaging in the use of illegal narcot-
ics.229 Similarly, a notice of a suspended liquor license in the window of a 
restaurant whose owners have failed to pay state taxes may cause potential 
customers to wonder whether the restaurant engaged in any number of 
offenses, ranging from serving minors to selling altered alcohol.230 The far-
reaching and uncertain nature of the negative signals of collateral tax 
sanctions thus can further deter some individuals from failing to properly 
report and pay their taxes. 
b. Personal Signals 
Certain collateral tax sanctions can also cause individuals to reveal tax 
noncompliance to their personal associates. If an individual’s tax delinquency 
causes him to lose the use of his driver’s license for a period of time, he 
could be forced to reveal his failure to pay his taxes to others. As a result of 
the driver’s license suspension, for instance, an individual might need to ask 
for assistance from friends and family members in order to travel to work, 
complete household errands, and transport his children to and from after-
school activities.231 This individual could feel compelled to admit his tax 
noncompliance to his friends and family members rather than allow his 
personal associates to speculate as to whether he committed a more danger-
ous act, such as driving recklessly or while intoxicated. As long as an 
individual fears adverse reactions from personal associates, or at least is 
embarrassed that he will have to reveal his tax noncompliance to them, the 
potential negative signals of certain collateral tax sanctions can, in the 
individual’s mind, overshadow the benefits of tax noncompliance. 
 
229  See, e.g., Disciplinary Actions from the Most Recent Journal, N.C. ST. BAR, http:// 
www.ncbar.com/discipline (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).  
230 These are just a few of the potential reasons that might explain suspension of a restaurant’s 
liquor license. See generally CITY OF BOULDER, FIN. DEP’T, TAX & LICENSE DIV., BEVERAGES 
LICENSING AUTHORITY PENALTY SCHEDULE (last updated Jan. 5, 2011), available at https://www-
static.bouldercolorado.gov/docs/Violations_and_penalties-1-201307221353.pdf. 
231 See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. 
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5. Collateral Tax Sanctions Bolster Confidence Among Taxpayers 
Motivated by Feelings of Reciprocity 
Collateral tax sanctions are more likely than monetary tax penalties to 
promote compliance by individuals who pay their taxes because they believe 
that other taxpayers are doing so as well—in effect, reciprocating their good 
behavior.232 Reciprocity theory hypothesizes that individuals are inclined to 
pay their taxes only if they believe that other individuals are reciprocating 
their compliant behavior.233 For “reciprocator” taxpayers, it is essential that 
the government appears to detect and punish freeriders—individuals who 
fail to comply with the tax system.234 The federal government’s strategic 
publicity of its own tax enforcement actions, for example, reveals that its 
officials are well aware of the basic concept of reciprocity theory.235 One 
former head of the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division has commented, 
“People who pay what the law requires deserve the assurance that those who 
don’t, and those who promote or facilitate tax evasion, will not get away 
with it.”236  For several reasons, collateral tax sanctions can enable the 
government to provide this assurance more effectively than the threat of 
monetary penalties or strategic publicity of its tax enforcement efforts. 
 
232 The application of the reciprocity theory to tax compliance derives from several studies. 
See BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, ANNUAL UPDATE 2011-2012, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/83719/Behavioural- 
Insights-Team-Annual-Update-2011-12_0.pdf (reporting reciprocity experiments that encouraged 
individuals to pay outstanding tax liabilities); STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS (1996) 
(exploring the effectiveness of various strategies designed to improve voluntary compliance with 
the Minnesota individual income tax); Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax 
Compliance (2): A Field-Experiment 2 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper 
No. 8, 2001) (finding that tax compliance is linked to taxpayer perceptions of various social 
norms). 
233 See Fehr & Gächter, supra note 163; Kahan, supra note 223. 
234 See Kahan, supra note 223, at 368 (“The reciprocity theory holds that individuals in collec-
tive action settings behave not like rational wealth maximizers but rather like moral and emotional 
reciprocators.”). 
235 See HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 255 (2000) (noting that “public-
spirited contributors want to retaliate against free-riders, and the only way available to 
them . . . is by not contributing themselves”). Several studies have demonstrated that individu-
als reduce their compliance with the law if they perceive that others are cheating. See James 
Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 891 
(1995) (exploring the motives underpinning charitable giving); Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, 
and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122, 122-38 (1995) (finding that subjects take 
others’ “inappropriate behavior” into account when making their own decisions). 
236 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and Internal Revenue Service 
Highlight Tax Enforcement Results (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07216.htm. 
  
2014] Collateral Compliance 763 
 
a. Publicity 
Collateral tax sanctions generate significant amounts of media attention. 
For example, California’s enactment of the driver’s license revocation 
provision in 2011,237 the U.S. Senate’s debate over the revocation of pass-
ports in 2012,238 and the Louisiana legislation that empowered the state to 
rescind hunting licenses from tax delinquent individuals239 were featured in 
dozens of stories in newspapers, radio and television reports, and blog posts. 
This media attention is attributable to the high salience of the government 
benefits and services that collateral tax sanctions confiscate and the contro-
versy that often surrounds the enactment of these measures. Further, 
because federal and state legislatures rarely implement dramatic changes to 
the monetary tax-penalty structure,240 the introduction of collateral tax 
sanctions presents an opportunity for journalists to write entertaining and 
digestible news stories about tax developments. This heightened media 
coverage can thus cause reciprocator taxpayers to develop the perception 
that the government is focused on preventing tax noncompliance. 
b. Observability 
Collateral tax sanctions can also strengthen feelings of reciprocity by 
causing the public to observe specific examples of the government’s success 
in detecting and punishing tax-noncompliant individuals. Under federal and 
state law, tax-return information is protected by broad taxpayer privacy 
rules.241 As a result of these protections, the general public cannot deter-
mine whether a particular taxpayer has been audited or required to pay a 
monetary tax penalty. Even tax liens are not easily observable because 
individuals must search court records to discover them, and with the 
exception of celebrities, the media does not report on most individuals’ tax 
liens.242 Scholars have argued that the “non-observability” of the compliance 
or noncompliance of other taxpayers poses a “serious problem” to attempts 
to apply reciprocity theory to taxpayer behavior.243  
Collateral tax sanctions, however, can force some noncompliant taxpay-
ers who have been caught and punished to appear in front of the curtain of 
 
237 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra subsection I.B.3.a.i. 
239 See supra subsection I.B.3.b.iv. 
240 See Osofsky, supra note 213 (exploring the connection between tax law certainty and tax-
payer compliance). 
241 See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 213.053(6) (West 2013). 
242 See, e.g., Lifsher & Wilson, supra note 177 (describing various celebrity tax liens). 
243 Doran, supra note 21, at 136 n.134. 
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taxpayer privacy. For example, the owner of a restaurant would feel confi-
dent about the government’s tax enforcement capabilities if he were to 
observe a forfeiture-of-liquor-license sign in the window of one of his 
competitors who failed to pay its outstanding tax liability. Likewise, when a 
physician learns that a fellow doctor has forfeited his medical license as a 
result of engaging in tax evasion, he would feel that few of his colleagues 
would likely be willing to engage in similar acts, given the significance of 
the resulting penalty. Collateral tax sanctions thus can provide reciprocator 
taxpayers with specific examples of the government’s tax enforcement 
successes, whereas the use of monetary tax penalties results in anonymous 
and therefore much less memorable tax-enforcement statistics.244 
c. Peer Group Examples 
In addition to generating specific examples, collateral tax sanctions can 
also apply to members of a reciprocator taxpayer’s peer group. As tax 
compliance scholars have noted, the cooperative behavior posited by 
reciprocity theory most likely occurs when an individual believes that “other 
members of one’s in-group” are cooperating as well.245  
The media often publicizes instances where an individual taxpayer receives 
a criminal sanction for failing to comply with the tax law.246 As the federal 
government wins nearly all criminal tax cases, it attempts to maximize this 
publicity by prosecuting high-profile individuals where possible and by 
timing these prosecutions and guilty pleas to coincide with time periods 
when individuals are focused on preparing their individual tax returns.247 
During the 2006 criminal trial of Wesley Snipes, for instance, the public 
learned that the movie star had filed millions of dollars in fraudulent refund 
claims, adopted the “861 position” (a tax protester argument) and even 
signed fabricated tax return forms.248 While Snipes was ultimately convicted 
 
244 For a further discussion of the power of specific examples, see Blank, supra note 23, at 288-90. 
245 LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEO-
PLE 145 (2011); see also Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty 
Regimes, 44 U. CONN. L. REV. 675, 697-98 (2012) (discussing the relationship between peer group 
dynamics and tax enforcement efforts).  
246 See Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompli-
ance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 502 (2007) (finding that the media plays a large role in the 
dissemination of stories on tax enforcement, thereby increasing tax compliance); Robert M. Melia, 
Is the Pen Mightier than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1310-11 & n.3 (1987) (same). 
247 See Blank, supra note 23, at 316-17 (discussing the media’s role in taxpayer compliance). 
248 See United States’ Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Snipes, 2008 WL 6124556 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2008) (No. 06-22-Oc-10GRJ) (describing Snipes’s thirty-six-month prison 
term). 
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for willfully failing to file tax returns,249 it is possible that some reciprocator 
taxpayers viewed his conviction as an indication that only extreme acts of 
tax evasion committed by tax protestors are the types of offenses that result 
in detection and prosecution by the taxing authorities. 
Because collateral tax sanctions result in specific examples of enforce-
ment and can affect a diverse group of taxpayers, however, they can further 
increase reciprocator taxpayers’ confidence in the government’s ability to 
ensure that their peers are paying their fair share of taxes. For example, 
when a prominent attorney at a New York City law firm forfeited his law 
license in 2012 as a result of his failure to file tax returns or pay taxes for 
several years,250 he appeared in a public court and the press covered his 
story extensively.251 Upon hearing this news, another New York City law 
firm partner, who has dutifully filed her tax returns in the dozens of juris-
dictions in which her firm conducts business, may have felt relief that she 
has not acted like a “chump” by engaging in burdensome tax return prepara-
tion and making sizeable tax payments while her colleagues at other firms, 
or even the same firm, simply ignored their tax obligations.252  
For reciprocator taxpayers, observable punishments for tax delinquency 
are especially important. If reciprocator taxpayers perceive that the taxing 
authority is not capable of detecting blatant acts of tax delinquency, they 
may doubt whether the authority possesses the ability to attack far more 
sophisticated forms of tax avoidance and evasion. By generating media 
attention and, in some cases, exposing specific tax offenders who have been 
detected and punished, collateral tax sanctions can more effectively preserve 
or enhance reciprocator taxpayers’ beliefs that the government is capable of 
controlling the growth of tax noncompliance than traditional monetary tax 
penalties.  
 
249 See Wesley Snipes Gets 3 Years for Not Filing Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, at C3 
(describing Snipes’s sentence for noncompliance). 
250 In re O’Brien, 946 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
251 See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Ex-Sullivan & Cromwell Lawyer Gets 28 Months for Tax Crime, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-11/ex-sullivan-cromwell-
lawyer-gets-28-months-for-tax-crime-2-.html.  
252 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1487 (2003) (citing Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 
2001, at 125). 
  
766 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 719 
 
6. Collateral Tax Sanctions Reinforce Tax Compliance as a  
Duty of Citizenship 
A final oft-discussed motivation of individual tax compliance is that 
some individuals feel that paying taxes is an important duty of citizenship.253 
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously proclaimed, “I like to pay taxes. 
With them I buy civilization.”254 The growing use of collateral tax sanctions 
may thus have positive impacts on tax compliance by individuals who feel a 
similar patriotic obligation to pay their taxes.  
Scholars have long argued that the government can preserve, and per-
haps even improve, tax compliance among patriotic taxpayers by convincing 
them that their tax dollars provide valuable government benefits and 
services. As economist Richard Bird has phrased this objective, an “essential 
institutional feature” of tax administration is the government’s demonstra-
tion of clear “expenditure–revenue links” between tax payments and the 
services and benefits they fund.255 Numerous studies have confirmed that, as 
taxpayers increasingly perceive that the government is using their tax 
dollars to provide public goods, their willingness to cooperate with the state 
and to pay their taxes out of a duty of citizenship—often described as “tax 
morale”—rises as well.256 
The challenge is that the link between tax revenues and government 
expenditures is not always apparent to taxpayers. As a result, several 
scholars have offered proposals that would increase positive publicity of the 
government benefits and services that tax dollars provide. For example, Yair 
Listokin and David Schizer have argued that the government should 
“trumpet” its use of taxpayer dollars in “signs about ‘your tax dollars at 
work’” and “in press releases from politicians about benefits secured for 
 
253 See James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and 
in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 228-29 (2006) (arguing that taxpayers’ willingness to pay 
taxes increases as they perceive that the state provides public goods); John T. Scholz, Contractual 
Compliance: Tax Institutions and Tax Morale in the U.S. (describing the concept of “tax morale”), in 
TAX EVASION, TRUST AND STATE CAPACITIES 51 (Nicolas Hayoz & Simon Hug eds., 2007); 
Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from 
Multicultural European Countries, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 443, 444 (2007) (citing studies linking “tax 
morale” to decreased tax evasion).  
254 FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 
(1938) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes). 
255 Richard M. Bird, Evaluating Public Expenditures: Does It Matter How They Are Financed?, 
in FISCAL MANAGEMENT 83, 95-96 (Anwar Shah ed., 2005). 
256 See, e.g., Ronald G. Cummings et al., Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental 
and Survey Evidence 4 (Leitner Program in Int’l & Comparative Political Econ., Working Paper 
No. 2005-22, 2005), available at http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/docs/botswana.pdf (arguing 
that tax compliance increases with the perception that the government is “providing valued goods 
and services with the revenues”). 
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constituents,” just as charitable organizations rely heavily on the use of print 
and electronic media to inform their donors and potential donors of the 
specific initiatives that their contributions support. 257  Similarly, Joshua 
Rosenberg has argued that the government should produce advertisements 
featuring projects and services such as “[b]rief shots of hospitals, schools, 
roads, jetfighters, people eating wholesome food, taking safe drugs, etc.” to 
enhance positive associations toward tax payments.258 Outside the United 
States, several national governments have deployed television and radio 
advertisements similar to these proposals.259  
Collateral tax sanctions offer another approach for enhancing tax morale. 
By rescinding benefits and services from individuals who have failed to pay 
their outstanding tax liabilities, the government can maintain and strengthen 
the public perception that tax dollars indeed fund critical benefits and 
services. As a result of the high salience of collateral tax sanctions and their 
implication of the loss-aversion bias, individuals are likely to pay greater 
attention to the possibility of losing those benefits than to the government’s 
positive publicity of benefits and services that citizens already enjoy and are 
not in immediate danger of losing. 
Collateral tax sanctions establish explicit links between tax payments 
and concrete government benefits and services, and can do so even more 
effectively than positive publicity campaigns. Even if the federal govern-
ment publicizes its improvements to the interstate highway system or its 
assistance to home mortgage borrowers, for example, some individuals may 
be skeptical that their tax dollars actually contributed to those efforts. By 
revoking an individual’s driver’s or recreational hunting license, on the other 
hand, a state government can cause its residents to perceive taxes as pay-
ments that fund structurally sound roads and safe, well-maintained hunting 
grounds. Likewise, if the federal government enacts legislation that would 
revoke passports from tax delinquents, it can remind individuals that their 
tax dollars pay for protections that the U.S. government and its embassies 
 
257 Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government 
Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 194 (2013). 
258 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can 
Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 229 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
259 The Canada Revenue Agency, for example, has used television advertising as a way to 
discourage people from paying contractors under the table. See, e.g., Get It in Writing! Before You 
Build or Renovate..., CAN. REVENUE AGENCY (June 16, 2010), http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ndrgrnd/ 
wtchvd-eng.html. South Africa has also used television commercials to achieve the types of linkages 
described above. In one video, the tagline at the end of the ad is “THANK YOU SOUTH AFRICA: 
Your Tax Is Touching Lives.” See SARS TV, A Second Chance, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iM91LCxpVxs&feature=share&list=PL2cgdzQm93yo2h5CoYlyw
DXBf0tE3QMR8. 
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provide when Americans travel abroad.260 Collateral tax sanctions thus 
essentially encourage individuals to view their taxes as “user fees” that they 
pay in exchange for commonly used benefits and services.  
Another advantage of collateral tax sanctions is that they can enhance 
expenditure–revenue links in the minds of individual taxpayers without 
provoking contradictory messages that often surround positive publicity 
campaigns. As advocates of the positive publicity approach, such as Listokin 
and Schizer, acknowledge, when the government publicizes its programs, 
political opponents of the incumbent party often criticize the effort as an act 
of credit-claiming.261 For example, when the U.S. Department of Labor 
advertised its new “green jobs” training programs in 2009, opponents of the 
Obama Administration publicly dismissed the publicity effort as a political 
use of taxpayer dollars that did not “pass the basic sniff test.”262 These 
conflicting characterizations may have muted the value of the new program 
for many taxpayers. Collateral tax sanctions do not create similar opportuni-
ties for politicians to accuse each other of attempting to publicize specific 
government benefits or programs. Instead of requiring government officials 
to “trumpet”263 specific government benefits and services, collateral tax 
sanctions simply take these benefits and services away from individuals who 
do not pay for them.  
C. Drawbacks 
Collateral tax sanctions encourage the proper reporting and payment of 
tax liability by individuals who are influenced by different, often overlap-
ping, motivations of compliance, yet they also present several potential 
drawbacks. These are discussed below. 
 
260 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. PASSPORT CARD FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS, available at http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_3921.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2014) (explaining that the cost of the U.S. passport card is based on the “cost of providing 
consular services” to U.S. passport holders). 
261 Listokin & Schizer, supra note 257, at 194. 
262 See Judson Berger, Labor Department Spent $500G in Stimulus on Green-Job Ad Blitz on  
Olbermann, Maddow, FOXNEWS (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/22/ 
labor-department-spent-500g-in-stimulus-funds-on-ads-during-olbermann-maddow (quoting Rep. 
Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah)). 
263 See Listokin & Schizer, supra note 257, at 194. 
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1. Spillover Effects 
A significant drawback of certain collateral tax sanctions is that, by revok-
ing government privileges and benefits, they impose spillover effects on 
parties other than noncompliant taxpayers.264  
Consider a few illustrations of the people and activities that several of 
the collateral tax sanctions described above affect. When an individual 
forfeits her driver’s license as a result of failing to pay her established tax 
liability, for example, she loses the ability to drive herself to professional 
and personal activities. But the driver’s license revocation can also adversely 
affect her children and other family members who rely on her for transpor-
tation. Further, depending on the individual’s occupation, her employer may 
incur costs, such as having to hire a more expensive temporary employee. 
Monetary tax penalties, on the other hand, are borne more directly by the 
individual who committed the initial tax offense because they do not affect 
government benefits upon which individuals other than the noncompliant 
taxpayer rely. 
The potential spillover effects of collateral tax sanctions increase as the 
scope and application of these sanctions grow. If collateral tax sanctions 
such as revocation of professional licenses apply to common tax reporting 
errors or mistakes, they could result in substantial social costs. In light of 
the spillover effects, governments should be cautious when considering 
applying collateral tax sanctions to tax offenses that are committed by many 
individuals.  
2. Brute Deterrence 
Another possible harmful effect of collateral tax sanctions is that taxpayers 
may view some of these measures as illegitimate acts of brute deterrence265 
by the government. This reaction can occur especially in instances where 
individuals do not feel that the government enforces collateral tax sanctions 
with the same due process that it metes out when applying other penalties. 
A consequence of this perception is that some individuals could reduce, 
rather than increase, their tax compliance.  
If people do not consider the law or legal institutions to be legitimate, 
they can choose not to obey the law. Based on findings in several social 
 
264 For a general discussion of these effects, see Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1641, 1642-47 (2011). 
265 See Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? (noting that 
taxpayers who read reports regarding the “tax gap” were less likely to comply), in WHY PEOPLE 
PAY TAXES, supra note 161, at 211-14. 
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psychology studies, Tom Tyler has argued that individuals comply with the 
law because “[w]hen authorities are viewed as legitimate, their actions are 
more likely to be seen as fair.”266 For instance, one study of individuals’ 
reactions to police behavior found that, if individuals perceive that the 
police are applying the law fairly, they will yield to police authority and will 
cooperate with them when necessary.267 Another study found that individu-
als’ belief that the government acts in a procedurally fair manner corre-
sponds with a sizeable increase in individuals’ likelihood to cooperate with 
various government agencies, including the taxing authority.268 Though few 
studies of this theory have been conducted specifically in the tax context,269 
if individuals feel that the government’s tax enforcement efforts are not fair, 
they may react in a manner consistent with the findings in these studies. 
Certain collateral tax sanctions could appear illegitimate to some indi-
viduals. Such a perception could develop if individuals believe that a 
particular collateral tax sanction is directly at odds with a related tax 
administration objective of the government. For example, individuals who 
have failed to pay their taxes could object to a rule that forces them to 
forfeit their driver’s license because the effect of this policy will be to 
deprive them of the ability to earn income necessary to repay their tax 
liabilities.270 Individuals could also view a collateral tax sanction as illegiti-
mate if it imposes an excessive personal hardship, including its spillover 
effects. Finally, some individuals could feel that certain collateral tax 
sanctions are illegitimate if they apply without due process of law.  
 
266 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107 (2006); see also Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 291 (2003) 
(highlighting the negative impact that a decline in “trust and confidence” in the legal system has 
on compliance with the law); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (discussing the effects of perceptions of legitimacy on 
deference to authority). 
267 Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 524 (2003) (“[T]he legitimacy of the police 
is based on how well they perform, whether they effectively sanction rule-breakers, and/or whether 
police services are distributed fairly across society.”). 
268 Margaret Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 366 (2009). 
269 See Kathleen M. McGraw & John T. Scholz, Appeals to Civic Virtue Versus Attention to Self-
Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 471, 494 (1991) (finding that normative 
appeals may have some effects on tax attitudes); Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal 
Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 295 (1967) (finding normative appeals to have greater influence 
on tax compliance than deterrence factors).  
270 See ASSEMBLY COMM. ON REVENUE & TAXATION, 2011-2012 REGULAR SESSION, 
BILL ANALYSIS, AB1424, 4 (2011) (stating that revocation of an individual’s driver’s license will 
reduce his ability to earn income). 
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How might individuals who harbor such feelings of illegitimacy respond 
to collateral tax sanctions? One possibility is that, consistent with Tyler’s 
legitimacy research, some individuals could respond to hefty collateral tax 
sanctions by making greater efforts to escape detection by the taxing 
authorities rather than by cooperating at all.271 Some could respond by 
shifting business operations into the black market, where the government 
lacks the ability to monitor whether they even owe tax liability, let alone 
whether they have paid it in a timely manner. 
3. Horizontal Equity 
Taxpayers might also perceive that the government is acting unfairly if it 
applies collateral tax sanctions in a way that violates the principle of hori-
zontal equity.272 Though the question of whether the concept of horizontal 
equity should play a role in the design of tax policy is surely debatable,273 
many taxpayers feel that taxpayers who are similarly situated should be 
taxed in the same manner.274 Applying this concept to the tax enforcement 
context, policymakers aim to subject individuals who commit the same tax 
offenses to the same tax penalties.275  As the discussion above reveals, 
collateral tax sanctions can result in significant noneconomic costs and 
indirect economic costs.276 For example, individuals who commit the tax 
offense of tax delinquency and forfeit their professional licenses as a result 
of a collateral tax sanction will incur significant costs, which have both 
economic and noneconomic features, whereas individuals who do not hold 
the specified professional licenses and commit the same tax offense will only 
incur the significantly less costly monetary tax penalty. As will be discussed, 
governments can proactively respond to the horizontal equity concern by 
 
271 See sources cited supra note 266. 
272 For further discussion, see R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 44, 45-47 (1967). 
273 See, e.g., Peter J. Lambert & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Equity, Equality and Welfare, 39 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 674, 674-75 (1995) (comparing horizontal and vertical equity in the context of tax 
policy); Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393 (1993) (criticizing 
horizontal equity). But see Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1366-67 
(2008) (defending horizontal equity as having independent meaning as a default rule in favor of 
existing arrangements).  
274 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL 
TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 26 (Comm. Print 2001) (discussing 
the importance of “perceived horizontal equity”). 
275 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 406 (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/tres84v2C20.pdf (criticizing tax penalties that “undermine horizontal equity”). 
276 See supra subsection II.B.3. 
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designing collateral tax sanctions that are not restricted to a narrowly 
defined group of individuals, but that apply to a broader segment of the 
taxpayer population.277 
4. Tax Privacy 
Collateral tax sanctions also raise tax privacy concerns that traditional 
monetary tax penalties do not. A potential drawback of collateral tax 
sanctions is that they could cause individuals to fear that government 
agencies and officials other than the taxing authority will gain access to their 
personal tax return information.278 Even though taxing authorities regularly 
share tax return information with other government agencies as a result of a 
large number of statutory exceptions to taxpayer confidentiality,279 provid-
ing other agencies with access to individuals’ tax return information could 
result in abuse.280 These abuses could potentially involve the inappropriate 
use of personal tax return information by officials other than the employees of 
the taxing authority or the improper revocation of government benefits and 
services by non-tax agencies that attempt to apply collateral tax sanctions.281 
Regardless of whether the perception is accurate, if individuals believe 
that collateral tax sanctions reduce their tax privacy protections, they could 
respond in ways that negatively affect the taxing authority’s ability to 
administer and enforce the tax law. If individuals believe that collateral tax 
sanctions will allow non-tax agencies to gain access to their tax returns, they 
might limit the information that they reveal to the taxing authority.282 
Further, individuals could feel that the sharing of tax return information 
 
277 See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
278 Commentators have long argued that taxpayers will not cooperate with the taxing authority 
unless, as former Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon famously stated, they trust that their 
personal tax information “stops with the government.” 1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 18-19 (2000) (attributing the quote to Andrew Mellon); see also Blank, 
supra note 23 at 280-82. 
279 I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o) (2006). 
280 See, e.g., CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., THE DELINQUENT TAXPAYER ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACT (2012) (describing a variety of abuse concerns regarding driver’s license revocations); Jacoba 
Urist, No Taxes, No Travel: Why the IRS Wants the Right to Seize Your Passport, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/no-taxes-no-travel-why-the-
irs-wants-the-right-to-seize-your-passport/255940 (quoting Daniel Shaviro as stating that passport 
revocation from tax delinquents could “be misused, say, to harass specific individuals whom 
government officials dislike”). 
281 See id. 
282 The IRS itself has articulated this view. IRS, DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY LAW REFER-
ENCE GUIDE 1-17 (“By the single act of filing a tax return, a record is created and also a trust.”). 
For further discussion, see Blank, supra note 23, at 280-82. 
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with other agencies is illegitimate or unfair, especially if the other agency 
applies harsh collateral tax sanctions in an inconsistent and unpredictable 
manner. In response, they might reduce their individual tax compliance.283  
Although these reactions could occur if individuals believe that collateral 
tax sanctions enable non-tax agencies to gain broad access to their individual 
tax returns, these reactions are not justified in the case of many existing 
collateral tax sanctions. In the case of existing collateral tax sanctions, non-
tax agencies receive narrowly tailored and limited personal tax information 
of individuals directly from the taxing authority, such as a list of individuals 
who owe outstanding tax liabilities exceeding a certain threshold.284 None-
theless, because individuals place significant trust in the government when 
they submit detailed personal information on their tax returns, government 
officials should not ignore the potential tax privacy concerns that certain 
types of collateral tax sanctions raise. 
5. Observability 
Finally, the observability of some collateral tax sanctions is a feature that 
may strengthen tax compliance among certain individuals. If these sanctions 
are applied too broadly, however, observability could instead reduce tax 
compliance. If the government applies collateral tax sanctions that result in 
observable effects, such as individuals’ losses of professional licenses, to 
common tax offenses or to tax offenses that meet a low dollar threshold, 
many individuals could incur these sanctions. For individuals who are 
motivated by feelings of reciprocity,285 the frequent imposition of observable 
collateral tax sanctions could lead them to perceive that many individuals 
have engaged in tax noncompliance. A possible reaction from these recipro-
cator taxpayers could be to reduce their own compliance. Additionally, if the 
government applies collateral tax sanctions too frequently, the negative 
signal of tax noncompliance would likely become muted.286 If most individ-
uals lose their professional licenses temporarily as a result of a common tax 
offense, individuals’ fear of emitting this particular signal would decrease. 
Government officials, consequently, should consider the potential adverse 
effects of observability, along with each of the other drawbacks discussed 
 
283 See Levi et al., supra note 268, at 359. 
284 For example, in California, the Department of Motor Vehicles revokes the driver’s licens-
es of individuals who appear on lists that it receives directly from the taxing authority. CAL. VEH. 
CODE § 34623.1 (2012). 
285 See supra subsection II.B.5. 
286 See Posner, supra note 26, at 1790 (“Stigma arises only when a behavior or its detection is rare.”). 
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above, when deciding whether to deploy collateral tax sanctions as a means 
of enforcement. 
III. WHEN SHOULD COLLATERAL TAX SANCTIONS APPLY? 
When should governments apply collateral tax sanctions? While the 
previous discussion illustrates that collateral tax sanctions possess features 
that enable them to encourage tax compliance more effectively than the 
threat of additional monetary tax penalties, it also reveals that collateral tax 
sanctions present several significant drawbacks.287 If governments do not 
address these drawbacks, their use of collateral tax sanctions could be 
detrimental to their tax enforcement efforts.  
In light of the foregoing analysis of the competing benefits and detri-
ments, governments are in need of guidance regarding how they should 
apply collateral tax sanctions to maximize their positive impact on compli-
ance. This Part proposes guiding principles for the design and implementa-
tion of collateral tax sanctions, applies these principles to specific examples, 
and, finally, outlines publicity strategies for taxing authorities. 
A. Proposed Principles 
Below are three guiding principles that I propose governments should 
consider when crafting collateral tax sanctions.  
1. Tax Offense Is a Violation of a Tax Rule,  
Not a Tax Standard 
Collateral tax sanctions should apply when the underlying tax offense 
represents a violation of a tax rule, not a tax standard. A tax rule is clear, 
specific guidance that dictates ex ante whether a taxpayer is required to 
engage, or prohibited from engaging, in a particular action.288 For example, 
the requirement that individual taxpayers file their annual federal income 
tax returns on or before April 15th is a tax rule.289 A tax standard, by 
contrast, consists of general guidelines regarding particular conduct.290 The 
 
287 See supra Section II.C. 
288 See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 
539, 543-44 (2009) (distinguishing ex ante tax rules from ex post tax standards); Louis Kaplow, 
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1993) (“[T]he only distinction 
between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken 
before or after individuals act.” (emphasis omitted)).  
289 I.R.C. § 6072(a) (2006). 
290 See Blank, supra note 288, at 543; Kaplow, supra note 288, at 560. 
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only way to determine with absolute certainty whether a taxpayer has 
violated a tax standard is by receiving an ex post judgment from an adjudi-
cator such as a court.291 For instance, the requirement that a taxpayer’s 
transaction possess “economic substance”292 is a tax standard because it is 
not possible to know with absolute certainty whether the transaction 
satisfies this requirement until a judge reviews it.293 For several reasons, 
collateral tax sanctions should promote tax compliance more effectively and 
avoid many of the potential drawbacks described above if they apply to 
situations where taxpayers violate tax rules rather than tax standards. 
First, without clear advance notice, the threat of collateral tax sanctions 
is unlikely to serve as an effective deterrent for taxpayers who are influenced 
by their fear of sanctions. A collateral tax sanction that results from viola-
tion of an explicit tax rule, like the requirement that taxpayers pay estab-
lished tax liability by a specific date, is easier for the government to 
publicize with clear communication than one that results from a violation of 
a more ambiguous tax standard, such as a requirement that taxpayers not 
claim tax positions that reflect “negligence” or “disregard of rules and 
regulations.”294  
Further, a collateral tax sanction would affect fewer taxpayers if it ap-
plies to violations of a tax rule rather than violations of a tax standard. 
Compared to tax rules, tax standards are ambiguous. A state government, 
for instance, could create a rule that provides that any physician who 
engages in a transaction that is an abusive tax shelter must forfeit his 
medical license. The dilemma created by this provision is that taxpayers 
might not be able to predict with certainty whether a particular transaction 
indeed lacks economic substance until an audit, and possibly a trial, occurs. 
If the loss of a medical license in this example were to apply to situations 
where taxpayers had engaged in abusive tax shelters, the result could be the 
emergence of many observable instances of tax noncompliance. And without 
a definition of “tax shelter,” it is unclear whether collateral tax sanctions 
would even be capable of reducing their occurrence.295 Increased observability 
 
291 See Blank, supra note 288, at 543. 
292 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying an objective 
economic substance analysis to a taxpayer transaction). For a discussion of the development of the 
economic substance doctrine, see generally Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 389, 402-16 (arguing that the modern economic substance doctrine should be 
abandoned in favor of a direct inquiry into congressional intent). 
293 See Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641, 1650-51 
(2012) (describing the ex post nature of economic substance doctrine). 
294 I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) . 
295 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879, 879 (1995) (com-
menting that there is “no consensus definition of a ‘tax shelter’ in the law”). The Code contains a 
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of tax noncompliance poses risks under both the reciprocity and signaling 
models of tax compliance.296  
A final reason to restrict the use of collateral tax sanctions to violations 
of tax rules is that individuals may be less willing to enter settlements with 
the taxing authority in tax controversies if their admission of committing a 
tax offense will result in the revocation of a significant government benefit 
or service.297 If a state government, for instance, required individuals who 
negligently underpaid their taxes to forfeit their driver’s licenses for a 
specified period of time, individuals facing this sanction may be unwilling to 
settle the tax controversy with the taxing authority. As a result of the 
magnitude of the potential collateral tax sanction, they would likely argue 
their cases in front of judges, who would decide whether they violated the 
negligence tax standard, rather than accept the taxing authority’s charge. If 
the driver’s license suspension in this example instead resulted from a 
violation of a clear tax rule, such as the requirement to pay an established 
outstanding tax liability on time, those individuals may instead decide to 
settle the matter and face the collateral tax sanction because he would 
consider his chances of succeeding in court to be low. 
2. Tax Offense Should Be Defined by Tax Law and  
Identified by the Taxing Authority 
Collateral tax sanctions that result from a tax offense that the tax law 
defines and that a taxing authority identifies are likely to enhance tax 
compliance objectives more effectively than those that stem from definitions 
contained in non-tax statutes and that are applied by non-tax agencies. Non-
tax agencies have the authority to revoke government benefits as a result of 
tax offenses, which are defined in their own governing statutory or adminis-
trative law, rather than the tax law.298 These agencies can apply different, 
broader definitions of tax offenses than the taxing authority as a result of 
special qualifications relating to the specific benefits that these agencies 
 
general definition of tax shelter as a transaction that possesses a “significant purpose 
of . . . avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.” I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2006). 
296 See supra subsection II.C.5. 
297 The IRS Appeals Division settles approximately eighty-five percent of all tax controver-
sies. B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, IRS, Resolving Tax Shelters: By Settlement or 
Litigation, Address Before the Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxation Committee 8 (Feb. 25, 
2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/shelters-feb25.pdf. 
298 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012) (defining tax offenses in a U.S. Code section 
governing aliens and nationality); see also C.O. Lamp, Tax, Turpitude, and a Technical Test for 
Disbarment, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 94, 101-06 (1967) (describing confusion among state bars as to 
which tax offenses constitute moral turpitude). 
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provide. Further, the government could affirmatively allow non-tax agencies 
to describe and detect abusive tax activities, rather than merely revoke 
government benefits due to tax noncompliance.299 For example, if current 
tax privacy rules were altered,300 Congress could empower the Department 
of State to issue regulations defining tax offenses that result in the suspen-
sion of a U.S. passport and to identify instances where those offenses occur. 
For several reasons, however, such measures are unlikely to maximize the 
compliance benefits of collateral tax sanctions. 
The taxing authority has limited ability to deter tax noncompliance 
through advance publicity of collateral tax sanctions that result from laws 
other than the tax law and that are identified by other agencies. Extending 
the hypothetical from above, if the Department of State were authorized to 
apply its own definition of tax noncompliance when determining whether to 
revoke an individual’s passport, officials in this agency would develop their 
own internal standards for determining when certain acts of tax noncompliance 
merit revocation. Without coordination between agencies, IRS officials may 
not be aware of these standards, at least not in such depth that they would 
be capable of warning taxpayers ex ante of the potential collateral tax 
sanction of passport removal as a result of uncertain tax offenses.  
Further, if a collateral tax sanction results from a non-tax agency’s defi-
nition and identification of a tax offense, taxpayers might feel that the non-
tax agency lacks the expertise necessary to make this determination. While 
officials in non-tax agencies are certainly capable of reading the existing tax 
law when reviewing an individual’s tax returns, they may have little under-
standing of the case law, administrative rulings, or policy rationales that are 
necessary for an informed application of the tax law to particular facts.  
3. The Collateral Tax Sanction Should Be Proportionate  
to the Tax Offense 
Finally, when the government applies a collateral tax sanction, the bene-
fit or service that it revokes from an individual should have a proportionate 
relationship to the magnitude of the tax offense that triggers the sanction. 
Proportionality is frequently raised as a goal of punishment design for 
 
299 Such an argument might be made in the interest of efficiency and reduction of bureaucratic 
waste. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Annie Lowrey, Obama Bid to Cut the Government Tests Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at A1 (quoting President Obama as calling on Congress to grant him 
authority to propose mergers of government agencies, which Congress would then approve or reject). 
300 Federal law currently allows for limited sharing of individual tax return information between 
the IRS and other agencies, including state taxing authorities. I.R.C. § 6103(a), (c), (o) (2006). 
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equity or constitutional reasons.301 One could argue, for instance, that 
simply as a matter of fundamental fairness, the government should not 
suspend a benefit as a result of tax noncompliance if this act would be 
disproportionate to the underlying tax offense. An overarching objective of 
designing any collateral tax sanction thus should be to ensure that the 
resulting sanction represents just desert for the offender. Yet in addition to 
the general normative objective that tax penalties should be fair, govern-
ments should also consider the potential relationship between proportionali-
ty and compliance. As this final principle illustrates, disproportionate 
collateral tax sanctions could have detrimental effects on individuals’ tax 
compliance decisions and the government’s ability to administer the tax law 
efficiently. 
Collateral tax sanctions should satisfy a proportionality principle in order 
to maintain individuals’ willingness to cooperate with the taxing authority. 
Many people intuitively support the biblical mandate of lex talionis, com-
monly referred to as “eye for eye, tooth for tooth.”302 Criminal law theorists, 
such as Paul Robinson and John Darley, have argued that if the government 
deviates from this principle by applying disproportionate sanctions, it will 
weaken the law’s “moral credibility,” which in turn may “undercut its ability 
to help in the creation and internalization of norms and its power to gain 
compliance by its moral authority.”303  Although this theory of penalty 
design has been subject to criticism,304 it has also been supported by several 
empirical studies that report that individuals reduce their compliance with 
the law in response to the government’s application of disproportionate 
sanctions for offenses ranging from tax noncompliance305 to possession and 
 
301 If a civil fine or forfeiture represents a punitive rather than remedial measure, it may be 
limited by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Austin v. United States, 509 
U.S. 602 (1993). For discussion, see Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on 
Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 108-12 (1995) (discussing proportionality 
under the Eighth Amendment); and Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited 
Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 292-314 (2005) (same).  
302 Exodus 21:23-25. 
303 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 478, 
482 (1997); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED AND HOW MUCH? (2008); Paul H. Robinson et al., The 
Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
304 See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, How to Improve Empirical Desert, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 433, 441-
48 (2009) (criticizing theorists such as Robinson and Darley for cherry-picking certain moral 
intuitions, but ignoring others, in making their arguments); Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses 
About Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1189 (2011) (asserting that Robinson’s work on empirical 
desert could use further empirical support). 
305 Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey 
Data (finding that when subjects perceive tax law to be unfair as a result of friends’ excessive 
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use of marijuana.306 Though predictions of taxpayers’ responses to the 
government’s use of disproportionate collateral tax sanctions may not hold 
true for all individuals, in light of the existing empirical and theoretical 
support, governments should consider proportionality when determining 
which benefits and privileges to revoke, and for what length of time, in 
response to specific tax offenses. 
The difficult question, of course, is when individuals would perceive a 
collateral tax sanction to be disproportionate to the underlying tax offense. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided several cases that address the consti-
tutionality of disproportionate criminal sanctions307 and civil forfeitures.308 
In United States v. Bajakajian,309 Hosep Bajakajian attempted to board a 
plane from Los Angeles to Cyprus while carrying $357,144 in cash, but was 
stopped by U. S. customs officials.310 Bajakajian was charged with failing to 
declare his removal of more than $10,000 in cash from the United States.311 
Even though the maximum criminal fine was $5000, the government sought 
to force Bajakajian to forfeit the entire $357,144 because Bajakajian provided 
misleading answers regarding the reasons for his transport of the cash.312 
The Supreme Court held that this sanction represented a violation of the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment because it was “grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of [Bajakajian’s] offense.”313 
 
payment of taxes in response to IRS demands, they report a lower willingness to comply with the 
tax law in the future), in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 161, at 259; see also John T. 
Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 408 (1998) (finding that individuals’ trust in government increases 
willingness to comply with the tax law). 
306 Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2 L. & POL’Y Q. 61, 64-
67, 72 (1980) (reporting that only thirty-six percent of subjects who viewed marijuana bans as 
unfair refrained from using the substance); see also Robinson et al., supra note 303, at 2001-04 
(finding that individuals who are disillusioned by the unfairness of the criminal justice system are 
less willing to cooperate with police). 
307 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (introducing a three-part test for 
finding whether a criminal sanction is disproportionate to the crime and therefore in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). 
308 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559 (1996) (finding that excessively high punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause). 
309 524 U.S. 321. 
310 Id. at 325. 
311 Id.  
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 324. In response to this decision, Congress amended the forfeiture statute. See 18 
U.S.C. § 983(g) (2012) (introducing a proportionality standard). 
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While my analysis is not focused on the potential constitutionality of 
collateral tax sanctions,314 taxpayers likely consider some of the same factors 
as judges do when forming a view of whether a particular penalty is dispro-
portionate to the offense. For example, they may weigh the magnitude of 
the harm caused by the tax offense against the severity of the collateral tax 
sanction. To conduct this analysis, we may ask several questions: Is the tax 
offense similar to other offenses that result in the same sanction? What is 
the harm that results from the tax offense? What is the maximum formal tax 
sanction, civil or criminal, that an individual could face as a result of 
committing this particular tax offense? While the application of this analysis 
will not offer precise measurements, these factors provide a roadmap for 
determining whether individuals would likely perceive a collateral tax 
sanction as lacking proportionality. 
B. Beyond Tax Delinquency? 
Many of the collateral tax sanctions that apply to tax delinquency satisfy 
the three principles that I have proposed.315 As a result, the compliance 
benefits of those sanctions likely outweigh their potential detriments to 
individuals’ willingness to obey the tax law and cooperate with the taxing 
authority. 
Consider, for example, California’s policy of suspending driver’s licenses 
from the five hundred taxpayers who owe the greatest amount of income 
taxes and the five hundred taxpayers who owe the greatest amount of sales 
and use taxes.316 As I argued previously, this sanction possesses characteris-
tics that would have a positive impact on individuals affected by different, 
often overlapping, tax compliance motivations.317 But would it satisfy the 
three principles outlined above or instead result in some of the drawbacks of 
collateral tax sanctions? First, California revokes driver’s licenses as a result 
of a violation of an explicit tax rule—the requirement to pay established tax 
liability by a specified date.318 Second, this offense results from a violation 
 
314 While an examination of the constitutionality of each collateral tax sanction is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is possible that some sanctions would likely be deemed remedial, even 
though they also serve a deterrence purpose. See, e.g., Kvitka v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 551 
N.E.2d 915, 918 n.4 (Mass. 1990) (holding that the revocation of a physician’s professional license 
for unlawfully dispensing controlled substances is remedial rather than punitive); see also State v. 
Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the purpose of a driver’s license 
revocation is to protect the public).  
315 See supra Section III.A. 
316  CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7063, 19195 (2012); CAL. VEH. CODE § 34623.1 (2012). 
317 See supra note 180-86 and accompanying text. 
318 CAL. VEH. CODE § 34623.1 (2012). 
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of California’s tax laws and the California taxing authority provides a list of 
the names of the top tax delinquents to the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles.319 Third, it is unlikely that taxpayers consider this sanction to be 
disproportionate to the underlying tax offense. The individuals subject to 
this collateral tax sanction are not significantly different from individuals 
who lose their driving privileges for other reasons, such as failing to attend 
a driver’s education program or simply foregetting to renew their outstand-
ing license. The harm to the state imposed by the individuals on this list 
(the worst offenders) may amount to millions of dollars of unpaid tax 
liability,320 and until each offender pays the outstanding tax liability or 
enters into an installment payment plan, the harm is ongoing. Finally, the 
sanction is not excessively severe compared to other sanctions that could 
apply to this offense, such as levies on property.321 This sanction will likely 
produce its intended compliance benefits without generating significant 
adverse effects. 
Could governments apply collateral tax sanctions to address offenses 
other than tax delinquency? To consider this question, this Section applies 
the three guiding principles described above to several hypothetical collat-
eral tax sanctions. The objective of this Section is not to provide an exhaus-
tive list of new collateral tax sanctions, but rather to illustrate how 
policymakers should apply the proposed principles when deciding whether 
to adopt a particular sanction.  
1. Nonfiling and Professional Licenses 
The failure to file tax returns, as opposed to the failure to pay outstand-
ing taxes, causes taxing authorities to face significant difficulty in calculating 
and collecting taxes. In California, for example, more than 800,000 residents 
who were required to file state tax returns ignored their obligation in 2009, 
resulting in an estimated $650 million of unpaid tax liability, or 10% of 
California’s state tax gap.322 At the federal level, at least $28 billion of tax 
revenue goes uncollected each year due to nonfiling.323 While many states 
have enacted collateral tax sanctions that revoke benefits and services from 
 
319 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 7063, 19195 (2012). 
320 See Miranda, supra note 117. 
321 See CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, COLLECTION PROCEDURES (2009), available at 
www.boe.ca.gov/pdf/pub54.pdf (describing the levy process for deficient taxpayers’ real or 
personal property). 
322 More Background on the Tax Gap, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/ 
Tax_Gap/background.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
323 IRS, supra note 37. 
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individuals who fail to pay their established tax liability, they have not 
developed similar sanctions that specifically apply to individuals who have 
failed to file tax returns. 
To address the problem of tax return nonfiling, a state government could 
suspend or deny any professional license issued by a state agency in that 
state if (1) the individual who holds or seeks the license has failed to file 
personal state tax returns for the past two consecutive years and (2) the 
individual had a legal obligation to do so. The sanction would apply, until 
the individual files those outstanding tax returns and would apply in 
addition to any monetary tax penalties and interest owed to the taxing 
authority as a result of the failure to file. This proposal expands the scope of 
existing collateral tax sanctions by targeting nonfiling of tax returns, rather 
than just nonpayment of taxes. It also alleviates some of the horizontal 
equity concerns regarding collateral tax sanctions that were discussed above, 
where a narrowly defined group of tax-delinquent individuals, such as 
physicians and lawyers, incur greater tax sanctions than other noncompliant 
taxpayers by forfeiting their licenses to practice their professions. In 
contrast, this proposal would apply not only to lawyers and phsyicians but 
also to many other professionals such as pharmacists, electricians, psycholo-
gists, and building contractors.324  
Considering the multiple motivations of compliance, this proposal could 
reduce instances of nonfiling among individuals who hold professional 
licenses. The threat of revocation of a professional license, which could 
result in significant loss of future income, should serve as an effective 
deterrent against the failure to file. This sanction should also have a positive 
influence on individuals who work in professions where tax noncompliance 
carries a stigma and might therefore cause them to lose the trust of their 
patients, customers, or clients. The sanction would encourage these individ-
uals to file their tax returns so that they would not be forced to explain the 
reasons for their temporary license suspension. And for aspiring professionals 
who do not yet hold a license, this policy could instill in them an under-
standing of their legal obligation to comply with the tax law.  
In addition to its potential compliance benefits, this policy avoids poten-
tial drawbacks of collateral tax sanctions because it satisfies each of the three 
proposed principles. 
 
324 See, e.g., Types of Licenses, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF LICENSING, http://www.dol.wa.gov/ 
business/professionals.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
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a. Tax Rule 
The requirement to file a tax return is an explicit tax rule, not a tax 
standard. As long as a taxpayer meets the threshold income requirement, 
there is no ambiguity regarding whether the taxpayer must take a specific 
action. In almost all cases, the taxpayer can make a determination ex ante 
that he is required to file a return and does not need to receive a formal 
judicial opinion or administrative ruling.325 The taxing authority and the 
licensing agencies can clearly communicate the policy that individuals who 
fail to meet the explicit tax rule requiring timely filing of tax returns will 
forfeit their ability to practice their professions legally. 
b. Tax Law and Taxing Authority 
The revocation of a professional license under this policy occurs as a 
result of a violation of a tax rule contained in the tax law—the requirement 
to file returns.326 To ensure that the taxing authority makes the determina-
tion that an individual has failed to file tax returns for two years, the taxing 
authority could provide a list to each licensing agency in the state of all 
taxpayers who have, according to the taxing authority’s records, failed to file 
tax returns in that time frame. This arrangement would avoid creating the 
perception that licensing agencies are launching their own independent 
investigations of individuals’ tax returns. It is also consistent with the 
approach that many states currently use when empowering non-tax agencies 
to revoke licenses from individuals who have failed to pay outstanding taxes 
in excess of certain threshold amounts.  
c. Proportionality 
Individuals would likely consider the revocation and denial of profes-
sional licenses as a proportionate sanction for the failure to file tax returns 
for two years. The tax offense of failing to file a tax return is certainly 
comparable, if not significantly greater than, other offenses that also result 
in the revocation of a professional license. Under this proposal, for example, 
lawyers who fail to file tax returns for two years would forfeit their law 
license until they file their outstanding tax returns, just as lawyers who fail 
 
325 See Kaplow, supra note 288, at 560 (defining a rule as “entail[ing] an advance determina-
tion of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator”). 
326 See, e.g., Do I Need to File?, CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/ 
individuals/fileRtn/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (providing a chart that individuals can 
use to determine whether they must file a California income tax return). 
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to pay their outstanding tax liabilities would also lose that same privilege.327 
The potential harm to the government from an individual’s failure to file a 
tax return is significant, as the government expends resources to attempt to 
determine the individual’s income or, alternatively, has little ability to detect 
the individual’s failure to pay taxes on significant amounts of income. 
Individuals may not consider the sanction to be excessively severe, given 
that if the criminal tax law were applied instead, individuals who deliberate-
ly fail to file their tax returns could be subject to far greater tax penalties, 
including prison sentences.328 
2. Household Employment Taxes and FDIC Insurance 
Most individuals who pay household employees do not comply with the 
household employment tax rules. Under federal law, individuals who pay at 
least $1900 per year to a household employee, such as a nanny, health aide, 
or housekeeper, are required to withhold Social Security and Medicare329 
taxes from the employee’s wages and to pay an employer’s share of these 
taxes, plus federal unemployment insurance taxes.330 The household em-
ployer is required to complete a form with her annual personal tax return331 
and remit these taxes to the IRS, along with additional information regarding 
the wages paid to the employee. Compliance with these rules is notoriously 
low. 332  According to one recent study, the household employment tax 
 
327 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text. 
328 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Ohio Insurance Salesman Sentenced to 37 
Months in Prison for Tax Evasion (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/October/12-
tax-1247.html. 
329 See I.R.C. § 3101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring employers to withhold 6.2% from 
their employees’ wages for Social Security and 1.45% for Medicare); I.R.C. § 3111 (2006 & Supp. 
V 2012) (requiring the employer to pay 6.2% of the paid wages for Social Security and 1.45% for 
Medicare); IRS, PUBLICATION 926, HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE (2014), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p926.pdf. 
330 See I.R.C. §§ 3301, 3306(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (imposing a 6% rate on the first 
$7000 of an employee’s wages). 
331 IRS., SCHEDULE H (FORM 1040), HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT TAXES (2013), avail-
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sh.pdf. 
332 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Nanny Tax Evasion Grows Bigger and Bigger, 128 TAX 
NOTES 783 (2010) (noting that in 1995 two million households employed legal domestic help, but 
only a quarter of them filed a Schedule H to report and pay the payroll taxes of their workers). 
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noncompliance rate may be as high as seventy percent,333 resulting in a tax 
revenue loss of at least $15 billion annually.334  
One possible resolution to this problem is for the federal government to 
enact legislation providing that, if the IRS determines that an individual has 
paid a household employee at least $30,000 in wages during the year and has 
not paid all required household employment taxes, the individual will 
forfeit Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage on all 
personal bank accounts until the end of the calendar year following the year 
of detection by the IRS. In addition, the individual must pay civil penalties 
for the underpayment of taxes. The FDIC provides free insurance to 
individuals of up to $250,000 for deposits in a qualifying bank; the coverage 
amount may be expanded significantly if the individual is married or if 
other conditions are met.335 This proposal could be modified to increase the 
threshold wage amount or the insurance suspension period depending upon 
the number of years of noncompliance. 
This particular collateral tax sanction may raise awareness of household 
employment tax obligations and induce cooperation in an area where 
noncompliance is high. FDIC coverage is a salient government benefit for 
individuals who hold liquid savings in bank accounts, especially in times of 
uncertainty regarding the financial viability of banking institutions.336 Many 
of the individuals who would be subject to this proposal—which again 
requires them to pay employees at least $30,000 in wages per year—likely 
hold funds in bank accounts in addition to their other investments. For 
some of these individuals, the thought of forfeiting FDIC coverage, even 
for one year, may provide significant motivation to comply with the house-
hold employment tax rules.337 Under the example above, if an employer 
loses FDIC coverage and one of the banks holding her personal funds were 
to fail by the end of 2013, he would receive no protection from the federal 
government.  
The next inquiry is whether, despite the theoretical compliance benefits, 
this proposal would implicate some of the potential negative effects of 
 
333 See Catherine B. Haskins, Household Employer Payroll Tax Evasion: An Exploration 
Based on IRS Data and on Interviews with Employers and Domestic Workers 119 (Feb. 2010) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Mass. Amherst), available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/ 
open_access_dissertations/163. 
334 See IRS, TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf. 
335 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2012) (increasing the standard maximum deposit insurance 
amount to $250,000 as of March 2010). 
336 See BANK FAILURES IN BRIEF: 2013, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008 (describing twenty-four bank failures in 2013). 
337 See subsection II.B.2. 
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collateral tax sanctions. As the analysis below demonstrates, the FDIC 
collateral tax sanction may satisfy only some of the proposed guiding 
principles. 
a. Tax Rule 
At first blush, the failure to pay household employment taxes seems to 
be a violation of an explicit tax rule. The IRC states that individuals who 
pay wages to household employees in excess of a specified amount ($1900) 
must pay the required taxes.338 Upon closer inspection, however, an individual 
may not know with certainty whether the IRS would characterize a particu-
lar service provider, such as a gardener or driver, as an “employee” for tax 
purposes until the IRS, or possibly a court, reviews the relevant facts.339 
According to the IRS, a worker is an employee if the service recipient 
controls not only the type of services that the worker provides, but also the 
manner in which the worker provides them. 340  Whether the requisite 
“control” element is present, however, is not necessarily apparent ex ante. A 
possible consequence of imposing such a salient collateral tax sanction is 
that when individuals face household employment challenges from the IRS, 
they may be less willing to settle the controversy and pay the resulting 
monetary tax penalties than if the collateral tax sanction were not in 
effect.341 
b. Tax Law and Taxing Authority 
The proposed FDIC collateral tax sanction would result from the appli-
cation of federal tax law and a determination by the IRS. If the proposed 
sanction were adopted, federal tax privacy rules would need to be amended 
to allow the IRS to provide the FDIC with both the list of specified 
individuals who have failed to pay all required household employment taxes 
and the length of their insurance coverage suspension periods. As the IRS 
would be permitted by statute to share only this discrete information with 
the FDIC, individuals’ concerns that the introduction of this collateral tax 
 
338 See I.R.C. § 3102(a) (2006); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 
76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,112 (Oct. 25, 2011) (setting forth threshold wage amounts).  
339 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3121(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (defining “employment”); Independent 
Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee (explaining the 
difference between independent contractors and employees). 
340  PUBLICATION 926, supra note 329, at 2 (defining “household employee”). 
341 See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
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sanction could lead to abuse of discretion by a non-tax agency should be 
allayed. 
c. Proportionality 
Individuals would likely view the proposed FDIC collateral tax sanction 
as proportionate for several reasons. First, as this sanction would be the 
only instance in which individuals would forfeit FDIC insurance, a fact 
which should make the sanction all the more salient, individuals would not 
compare the offense of nonpayment of home-employment tax to other 
offenses that result in the same sanction. Second, the government could 
argue that the nonpayment of this tax results in significant harm. When 
household employers disregard these rules, not only do they contribute to 
the federal tax gap, but they also prevent the IRS from detecting and taxing 
household employees. In addition, the widespread nature of the problem 
drives up the wage that a compliant individual must pay to a household 
employee if she is one of the few taxpayers who withhold and remit the 
required taxes.342 Last, assuming that the IRS publicizes the collateral tax 
sanction effectively, individuals may not view it as excessively severe. This 
sanction is certainly not greater in value than the potential criminal tax 
sanctions that could apply in the case of intentional nonpayment of the 
taxes.343 
This proposal provides an example of a collateral tax sanction that may 
represent a violation of a tax standard rather than a tax rule, but still 
satisfies the other two principles. How should governments decide whether 
to pursue such collateral tax sanctions as means of tax enforcement? To 
answer this question, we can consider specific elements of the proposed 
sanction that relate to the justifications for the tax rule principle. If the 
FDIC collateral tax sanction implicates a tax standard rather than a tax rule 
because the definition of “employee” is not clear, it is possible that some 
individuals may not settle disputes involving this issue with the IRS. This 
concern, however is likely alleviated by the fact that some individuals who 
would be subject to this sanction may be unwilling to reveal publicly that 
they have failed to report wages and pay required taxes for their household 
employees. As many nominees for cabinet positions have demonstrated, 
others may perceive the failure to pay household employment taxes to be a 
 
342 For a discussion of a New York law designed to protect payment of overtime for domestic 
employees, see Mona Simpson, Op-Ed., Pay Your Nanny on the Books, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at A25. 
343 See, e.g., Examples of Employment Tax Fraud Investigations—Fiscal Year 2012, IRS (Sept. 17, 
2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Employment-Tax-Fraud-Investigations-Fiscal-Year2012  
(describing criminal cases of federal-employment-tax evasion). 
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negative signal of lack of integrity or competence, or both.344 Consequently, 
these individuals may still choose to settle the dispute and forfeit their 
FDIC coverage privately rather than to reveal the nonpayment in litigation 
publicly.  
3. “Fraud and Deceit” Tax Offenses and Deportation 
Would the federal government increase tax compliance by deporting 
lawful permanent residents who willfully mislead a taxing authority? As 
previously discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kawashima v. Holder 
upheld the deportation of two lawful permanent residents who had previ-
ously pleaded guilty to willfully filing false tax returns.345 Though the 
Immigration and Nationality Act specifically designates tax evasion as an 
offense under section 7201 of the IRC and as an “aggravated felony” that can 
result in automatic deportation,346 Akio and Fusako Kawashima argued that 
this provision did not apply to them because they pleaded guilty to a lesser 
offense.347 The Court rejected this argument by finding that the Act’s 
reference in a separate provision to an offense that constitutes “fraud or 
deceit” and results in a loss of more than $10,000 to the victim implicitly 
includes tax offenses.348 Specifically, the Court held that for purposes of 
federal immigration law, the words “fraud and deceit” encompass tax 
offenses that involve willfulness and false statements, even though the 
federal tax law often does not specify that fraud is an element of these 
offenses.349  
As one option, the federal government could attempt to incorporate the 
Kawashima holding into its existing deportation policies. A potential 
collateral tax sanction could be an affirmative policy by the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement to treat as an aggravated felony any crimi-
nal conviction of a lawful permanent resident for any tax offense that 
involves willfulness and false statements and tax liability of more than 
$10,000. These tax offenses could involve the willful delivery of false 
information to the taxing authority, as was the case in Kawashima, but they 
could also include other tax offenses at the federal, state, and local levels. 
 
344 See, e.g., Claudia Wallis, The Lessons of Nannygate, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 76 (describing 
the tax troubles of President Clinton’s nominees for Attorney General in 1993, Kimba Wood and 
Zoe Baird). 
345 Id. at 1168. 
346 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) (2012).  
347 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 12.  
348 Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012). 
349 Id. at 1173. 
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Finally, the immigration authorities could apply this sanction to any past 
criminal convictions as well, as current law does not include a statute of 
limitations on the identification of aggravated felonies.350 
Proponents of this policy might argue that it would not only help ensure 
that only citizens with good moral character retain lawful permanent 
resident status,351 but that it would also increase tax compliance. For a lawful 
permanent resident, there is no government benefit more salient than a 
Green Card.352 This benefit enables individuals to live in the United States, 
attain employment and, possibly, receive naturalized citizenship. 353  A 
primary objective of applying the holding in Kawashima, supporters would 
likely argue, is to encourage individuals who are motivated by the fear of 
sanctions to report and pay their tax liabilities properly. In theory, if federal 
immigration authorities threaten to strip this treasured benefit from lawful 
permanent residents who engage, or have engaged, in criminal tax offenses 
involving willful and false statements, some lawful permanent residents 
could respond by not engaging in any acts of tax noncompliance. 
Though this collateral tax sanction might cause some lawful permanent 
residents to respond positively, it might also result in adverse effects that 
could, in turn, weaken overall compliance. Accordingly, this policy fails all 
three of the guiding principles that I have argued governments should 
consider when designing collateral tax sanctions. 
a. Tax Rule 
In considering whether the presence of willful and false statements in a 
criminal tax offense sufficiently qualified as an act of fraud or deceit under 
the immigration laws, the Kawashima Court created an extremely broad tax 
standard, not a narrowly tailored tax rule. As Justice Ginsburg commented 
in her dissent, many tax crimes of varying magnitude involve false state-
ments or misleading conduct.354 Such offenses could include the delivery of 
a false Form W-2 to an employee,355 the failure to truthfully collect and pay 
 
350 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
351 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) (describing the importance of “good moral character” for 
the purposes of naturalization). 
352 For a description of the benefits of a Green Card, see Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011). 
353 Id. 
354 See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Johnnie M. Walters in Support of Petitioners 12-18, Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 10-577) 
(arguing that including “all willful” and “false tax crimes” is too broad). 
355 I.R.C. § 7204 (2006) (imposing a fine of up to $1000 for such an offense). 
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over taxes,356 the submission of false documents to the taxing authority, 
providing false documents,357 and many others. The Kawashima standard 
could also apply to misdemeanor offenses, such as the willful failure to file a 
tax return.358 This standard could also, theoretically, apply to any state or 
local criminal tax offense that involves willfulness and false statements. In 
California, for instance, it is a misdemeanor to provide false information 
when requesting a property assessment reduction.359 In light of Kawashima, 
it is not apparent which offenses may result in deportation. 
An immediate consequence of the breadth of the Kawashima standard is 
that the IRS may lack the ability to publicize the specific types of tax 
offenses that result in deportation. As it is not clear which tax offenses lead 
to deportation after Kawashima, the IRS would have little ability to warn 
lawful permanent residents that particular types of tax offenses can lead not 
only to formal tax penalties, but also to deportation as well. Alternatively, if 
lawful permanent residents perceive that this collateral tax sanction could 
apply to any type of tax offense, some might overreact by adopting only the 
most conservative tax positions possible (such as by claiming the standard 
deduction rather than itemized deductions).360 The adverse effect of such 
caution is that the IRS may not accurately assess individuals’ incomes and 
that individuals may not take advantage of social programs that are enacted 
as tax expenditures. 
Another implication of Kawashima is that lawful permanent residents 
who face criminal tax charges, whether felonies or misdemeanors, might 
refuse to enter guilty pleas if they fear that the immigration authorities will 
one day characterize these convictions as aggravated felonies. In the wake of 
Kawashima, lawful permanent residents could certainly react this way when 
charged with willfully filing false tax returns. But given the ambiguous 
meaning of the standard and the immigration authority’s ability to detect 
aggravated felonies without a statute of limitations, lawful permanent 
residents could display a similar response in any criminal tax case. Increased 
litigation would not only result in the diversion of tax enforcement re-
sources away from other important tax enforcement functions, but also, 
given its public nature, could cause taxpayers to view the government as 
disproportionately prosecuting lawful permanent residents for tax offenses 
compared to other types of offenders and offenses. 
 
356 I.R.C. § 7202 (imposing a fine of up to $10,000 for such an offense). 
357 I.R.C. § 7207 (imposing a fine of up to $10,000 for such an offense). 
358 I.R.C. § 7203 (imposing a fine of up to $25,000 for such an offense). 
359 See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 1610.4 (discussed in Brief for Amicus Curiae Johnnie M. 
Walters, supra note 354). 
360 See I.R.C. § 63(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (defining the standard deduction). 
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b. Tax Law and Taxing Authority 
In applying this collateral tax sanction, immigration officials search pub-
lic records for instances in which lawful permanent residents violated 
federal or state criminal tax laws. But the determination as to whether these 
offenses involve “fraud or deceit” sufficient to result in deportation is 
dependent upon immigration officials’ own interpretation of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.361 Unlike the other collateral tax sanctions dis-
cussed thus far, such as those where the taxing authority provided a list of 
individuals who have committed specific tax offenses to the non-tax agency,362 
this particular collateral tax sanction results from an offense that a non-tax 
agency identifies on its own. 
This feature could muddle the government’s attempt to increase compli-
ance through publicizing the collateral tax sanction of deportation. Taxpay-
ers, including lawful permanent residents, often learn about potential tax 
penalties from the IRS at the time they make decisions ranging from 
whether to report particular types of income to whether to file tax re-
turns.363 If IRS officials cannot accurately describe the tax offenses that lead 
to deportation under the aggravated felony statute because they do not 
know how the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will determine 
whether a particular tax offense merits this sanction, they will have little 
ability to influence individuals’ tax reporting decisions at the time they 
make them. The immigration authority’s separate interpretation of whether 
a particular offense constitutes fraud also conflicts with the IRS’s own 
public statements regarding what it views as fraud under the tax law. As a 
former IRS Commissioner has commented, “[T]he criminal tax laws do not 
treat crimes involving the ‘willful’ provision of ‘false’ information as inter-
changeable and synonymous with those involving ‘fraud or deceit’ under the 
immigration laws.”364  
c. Proportionality 
If immigration officials actively apply Kawashima, some individuals 
might perceive the collateral tax sanction of deportation to be dispropor-
tionate to the underlying tax offense. This reaction will likely occur if 
 
361 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated felony”).  
362 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 34623.1 (2012) (using a list of tax delinquents provided by the 
State Board of Equalization or the Franchise Tax Board to determine driver’s license suspension). 
363 See generally Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 
VA. TAX REV. 1, 4-5 (2010) (explaining the increase in tax enforcement press releases during tax 
filing season). 
364 Brief for Amicus Curiae Johnnie M. Walters, supra note 354, at 2. 
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officials apply this policy retroactively to lawful permanent residents who 
pleaded guilty to tax offenses involving false statements and willfulness, but 
that were lesser than tax evasion, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kawashima.  
An initial reason why individuals would likely view the sanction as dis-
proportionate to the underlying tax offense is that this particular sanction is 
often levied upon far more harmful offenses. For example, under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, aggravated felonies include murder,365 
rape, 366  sexual abuse of a minor, 367  and illicit trafficking of controlled 
substances.368 Individuals may not view the types of tax offenses potentially 
implicated by Kawashima—which could include misdemeanor tax offenses, 
such as willful failure to file a tax return—as crimes as grave as the non–tax 
related aggravated felonies. Further, offenses that involve physical violence or 
reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as driving while intoxicated,369 
are not considered to be aggravated felonies, while potentially minor 
criminal tax offenses may be considered to be aggravated felonies that could 
result in deportation.  
Though some tax offenses involving willfulness and false statements 
prevent the taxing authority from collecting substantial tax liabilities, others 
result in significantly less harm, especially when compared to the harms that 
result from some of the violent aggravated felonies described above. The 
monetary threshold for a fraud and deceit tax offense that can result in 
deportation is $10,000.370 For example, if a lawful permanent resident is 
convicted of filing a series of Form W-2s that contain false information and 
result in $3000 of lost tax revenue each year for a period of four years, this 
individual could face deportation for committing an aggravated felony.371  
Individuals might also view the sanction of deportation for tax offenses 
involving willful and false statements as excessively severe when compared 
to the maximum civil and criminal penalties for many of these tax offenses. 
 
365 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012). 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) . 
369 See, e.g., Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1180 n.2 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), and inquiring why a tax offense can result in deporta-
tion when more serious crimes do not); see also Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that felony convictions for driving while intoxicated do not constitute aggravated 
felonies). 
370 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii). 
371 In this example, the total loss to the “victim,” the federal government, would be $12,000. 
For further discussion, see Brief for Amicus Curiae Johnnie M. Walters, supra note 354, at 15-16 
(explaining that the threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 is not hard to meet in many jurisdictions). 
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As described above, some criminal tax offenses involving willful and false 
statements may result in a monetary fine. For example, in Ohio, the crimi-
nal offense of knowingly filing a false municipal tax return results in a $250 
fine.372 The additional sanction of deportation for this offense would likely 
appear to be vastly disproportionate to many individuals. But even for tax 
offenses that result in prison sentences, such as willfully filing a false tax 
return, the sanction of deportation may appear to be disproportionate. 
Some argue that deportation for an aggravated felony—a sanction that may 
cause an individual to separate from his children, forfeit a business, and face 
a permanent ban against from reentering the United States—is a punish-
ment that is even more severe than prison, regardless of the length of the 
sentence.373 
How would individuals respond if the government enforced Kawashima 
in a manner that they viewed as lacking proportionality? As scholars have 
predicted in other contexts, some lawful permanent residents might per-
ceive the government’s use of a disproportionate sanction for a vaguely 
defined tax offense as lacking legitimacy.374 One recent study has found that 
when people think that police officers target certain racial or religious 
groups disproportionately, they believe that the law lacks legitimacy.375 
Similarly, if individuals perceive the deportation of individuals who have 
committed tax offenses involving willful and false statements—some of 
which may have occurred prior to Kawashima—as illegitimate, they might 
reduce their cooperation with the taxing authority. Some lawful permanent 
residents could fail to report income or items that they believe the taxing 
authority may not detect, such as cash income or, for wealthy individuals, 
offshore bank accounts in their home countries.376 Rather than risk facing a 
collateral tax sanction that they perceive as illegitimate, these individuals 
might take the minimum action necessary, such as simply filing a personal 
 
372 Brief for Amicus Curiae Johnnie M. Walters, supra note 354, at 15 (discussing COLUM-
BUS, OHIO CODE § 361.31(a) (2009)). 
373 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (describing deportation as de-
priving an individual of “all that makes life worth living”). 
374 See supra notes 267, 305 and accompanying text. 
375 Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate With Law Enforcement?, 17 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 419, 429 (2011) (stating that police targeting of Muslim Americans after 
September 11, 2001, increased perceptions of a lack of police legitimacy by both Muslim Americans 
and Non-Muslim Americans). 
376  See Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Opens, IRS (Feb. 8, 2011), http:// 
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=235695,00.html (describing the 2011 offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Initiative, which encourages those with hidden assets in offshore accounts to become 
current with their taxes). 
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tax return, to satisfy an immigration court that they have attempted to 
comply with the tax law. 
As this discussion demonstrates, the government’s active application of 
Kawashima to individuals who have committed criminal tax offenses involv-
ing willful and false statements would likely produce mixed results. Some 
lawful permanent residents might believe that they are required by law to 
abide by heightened standards of moral conduct and, as a result, they may 
adhere to the letter of the law, including the tax law. These individuals 
would respond to the immigration authority’s active application of Ka-
washima by continuing to correctly report and pay their tax liabilities, and, 
as described above, would even forego tax credits and deductions to which 
they are entitled. Others, however, could refuse to enter into plea agree-
ments in criminal tax cases and may even limit the information that they 
reveal to the taxing authorities in their tax returns. As a result, it is far from 
certain whether the use of the collateral tax sanction of deportation for 
fraud and deceit tax offenses will result in net tax-compliance benefits. 
C. Publicity by Taxing Authorities 
Many of the positive effects of collateral tax sanctions discussed in this 
Article will occur only if taxpayers are aware of these measures. Existing 
collateral tax sanctions currently receive publicity, but not as a result of 
direct communication from taxing authorities. Taxpayers learn about the 
existence of collateral tax sanctions from other sources, and often after they 
have already engaged in tax noncompliance. In its publications and on its 
website, for example, the IRS does not discuss the risk of lawyers and 
doctors forfeiting their professional licenses in their respective states if they 
engage in abusive tax activities.377 Taxing authorities should play a more 
active role in publicizing these sanctions, specifically when they satisfy the 
guiding principles described above. This Section outlines approaches that 
taxing authorities could adopt to publicize collateral tax sanctions effectively. 
1. Strategic Publicity 
In contrast with their currently passive stances, taxing authorities should 
publicize the threat of collateral tax sanctions strategically, during encoun-
ters and at times when this information is likely to have its maximum 
impact on taxpayers’ perceptions and beliefs. Taxing authorities should 
 
377 See, e.g., IRS, PUBLICATION NO. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf; IRS, PUBLICATION NO. 587, BUSINESS USE 
OF YOUR HOME (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p587.pdf. 
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pursue this approach in their direct and indirect communications with 
taxpayers. 
Taxing authorities often directly communicate with noncompliant tax-
payers when they send them notices requesting that they pay their out-
standing tax liabilities. In these notices, they do not inform taxpayers of the 
collateral tax sanctions that may await them if they continue to ignore their 
outstanding tax obligations. For instance, under current law, when the IRS 
sends a Notice of Federal Tax Lien to taxpayers, it states the amount of their 
outstanding tax liability, and informs them that the IRS may seek to attach 
a lien to their property and warns that they will continue to accrue mone-
tary tax penalties and interest.378 The IRS does not, however, describe the 
collateral tax sanctions that may occur in addition to these consequences.379 A 
more effective form of direct communication would be for the IRS to 
describe in this notice not only the additional monetary tax penalties and 
interest that taxpayers may accrue if they continue to ignore their obliga-
tions, but also the government benefits that these individuals may sacri-
fice—such as a U.S. passport,380 qualification for an FHA loan,381 or the 
right to enter into contracts with the federal government.382  
But even before taxpayers become delinquent on their taxes, taxing au-
thorities should publicize the potential application of collateral tax sanctions 
during those periods of the year when taxpayers are most focused on their 
tax reporting and payment obligations. The federal government already 
appears to deliberately increase publicity of its tax enforcement actions, 
including criminal tax cases, during this period by issuing a disproportion-
ate number of tax enforcement press releases and announcements compared 
with the rest of the year.383 Strategic publicity could have positive effects on 
individuals’ perceptions of the taxing authority’s enforcement capabilities 
and, ultimately, on compliance.384 Similarly, taxing authorities should issue 
public announcements regarding potential collateral tax sanctions during 
 
378 See IRS, FORM 668(Y)(C), NOTICE OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN (1999); Understanding a 
Federal Tax Lien, IRS (July 5, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-%26-Self-
Employed/Understanding-a-Federal-Tax-Lien. 
379 See supra note 378. 
380 See supra subsection I.B.3.a.i. 
381 See supra subsection I.B.3.a.iii. 
382 See supra subsection I.B.3.a.iv. 
383 See Blank & Levin, supra note 363, at 17 (finding that from April 1 to Tax Day, the gov-
ernment issued 128% more tax enforcement press releases per week than during the rest of the 
year). 
384 For further discussion, see Blank, supra note 23, at 318-26 (examining how strategic pub-
licity may enhance individual taxpayer compliance under both the deterrence and reciprocity 
models of taxpayer behavior). 
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this period. Such strategic publicity is especially important if the collateral 
tax sanction stems from individuals’ tax reporting decisions, such as the 
proposed FDIC collateral tax sanction for household-employment-tax 
evasion.385 Individuals who learn of the collateral tax sanctions during the 
weeks leading up to Tax Day may, for example, revise their decision to omit 
their household employees and ignore their related tax obligations. But even 
if collateral tax sanctions would relate only to nonpayment, rather than 
underreporting, taxing authorities should nonetheless attempt to publicize 
these sanctions during this period. Moreover, for individuals whose motiva-
tion to comply with the tax law stems from feelings of reciprocity, this 
publicity would assure them that the most blatant form of tax avoidance—
the simple refusal to pay—does not go undetected or unpunished.386 
2. Specificity 
When taxing authorities publicize collateral tax sanctions, they should 
describe with specificity the tax offenses and the resulting denial or revoca-
tion of benefits. Due to the salient nature of the benefits at stake,387 confu-
sion among taxpayers and resentment toward the taxing authorities may 
result if taxing authorities fail to describe the potential collateral tax 
sanctions clearly.  
Taxing authorities should actively publicize collateral tax sanctions, in 
part, because officials of non-tax agencies may not possess sufficient exper-
tise in the tax law to describe these sanctions accurately to the general 
public. For instance, the Louisiana license statutes provide that an individu-
al’s hunting or fishing license will be revoked only if the individual owes a 
final assessment “in excess of five hundred dollars of individual income 
tax.”388 Yet, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries website—a 
source that is much more likely to be accessed by individuals than are the 
statutes—states that an individual may not receive a hunting or fishing 
license unless the individual can demonstrate that, during the previous 
twelve months, “he has filed a Louisiana state income tax return and has 
complied with state income tax laws and regulations.”389 Even though the law in 
Louisiana clearly applies only to the offense of tax delinquency, the plain 
English description of the law appears to expand its scope significantly. 
Under the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries’ interpretation of the 
 
385 See supra subsection III.B.2. 
386 See supra subsection II.B.5. 
387 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
388 LA. REV. STAT. § 47:296.3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
389 See Hunting Licenses, supra note 19 (emphasis added). 
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statute, individuals might perceive that failing to pay a small amount of tax 
or filing late returns will force them to forfeit their hunting licenses. One 
consequence of such a broad description of the law is that individuals could 
perceive that it is disproportionate to the offense and may, in response, 
reduce their cooperation with the taxing authority (since this is the agency 
that identifies the offenses that ultimately lead to license revocation). By 
actively explaining the specific tax offenses that may result in collateral tax 
sanctions, the taxing authority may prevent mischaracterizations of the law 
and the perception that it enlists other agencies to enforce unfair measures. 
In addition, taxing authorities should explicitly publicize the limits of 
the application of collateral tax sanctions. For instance, in California, a state 
with a population of nearly 38 million individuals, the collateral tax sanc-
tions that suspend driver’s licenses or deny their renewal affects only 1000 
tax delinquents, some of whom owe as much as $10.5 million in outstanding 
state taxes.390 Likewise, at the federal level, the proposed passport legisla-
tion would only apply to individuals who have failed to pay more than 
$50,000 in federal taxes.391 By publicizing such limits, the taxing authority 
would further protect itself from accusations that it is enforcing a dispro-
portionate sanction. Such charges are not merely hypothetical; they have 
been levied in the past. In March 2011, when the Senate passed the passport 
provision, commentators expressed sentiments similar to those of one talk 
radio host, who exclaimed that the law would empower the IRS to “arbitrar-
ily” direct the Department of State to revoke an individual’s passport.392 
With a more active public role, taxing authorities could preempt such 
inaccurate reports.  
Even if the taxing authority publicizes these limits, due to the high sali-
ence of these sanctions, some individuals will likely assume that collateral 
tax sanctions have greater application than they actually do under the law. 
For example, though the individual audit rate is approximately 1%, several 
studies of individual taxpayers’ beliefs have shown that individuals estimate 
that audit rates are as high as 48%393 and that more than 60% of individuals 
 
390 See Lifsher & Wilson, supra note 177 (describing the $10.5 million tax debt of Halsey M. 
Minor, founder of CNET.com). 
391  Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, S. 1813, 112th Cong., § 40304 (2012); 
see also text accompanying supra note 90. 
392 See Eric Blair, Keeping the Slaves on the Plantantion: Senate Says No Passport If You Owe Taxes, 
ACTIVIST POST (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.activistpost.com/2012/04/keeping-slaves-on-plantation- 
senate.html (“[The IRS] can arbitrarily determine any figure they wish to impose on a citizen 
without much recourse for the accused.”).  
393 John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citi-
zenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 497-99 (1995); see also Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. 
Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2  
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report that their fear of being audited has an influence on their decision of 
whether to pay taxes.394 But as long as the taxing authority clearly states the 
specific limits of collateral tax sanctions (just as the IRS explicitly describes 
the true 1% audit rate on its website),395 it would resist accusations that it 
has attempted to achieve tax compliance through misleading communications. 
3. Results 
When publicizing a particular collateral tax sanction that has been in 
effect for some time, taxing authorities should provide data regarding the 
effectiveness of the measure. As discussed earlier, nearly every collateral tax 
sanction will result in spillover effects upon other individuals, such as the 
children of tax delinquent individuals who must rely on someone else for 
transportation during the individual’s driver’s license forfeiture or the 
patients of tax delinquent physicians who must seek alternative care during 
their physicians’ medical license suspensions. A consequence of such 
spillover effects is that taxpayers could perceive the collateral tax sanction as 
unjustified in light of the underlying tax offense. The taxing authority can 
partially quell this concern by including, in its public statements regarding 
collateral tax sanctions, statistics that reinforce the message that these 
sanctions are effective. For example, as California’s driver’s license suspen-
sion program only applies to the top 500 income tax delinquents and the top 
500 sales and use tax delinquents, state officials could emphasize to the 
public that many individuals are removed from these lists each year as they 
make arrangements to satisfy their outstanding tax liabilities.396  
In addition to mitigating perceptions that the government has enacted 
overly harsh sanctions, this type of message would also have a positive effect 
on taxpayers affected by two specific motivations of compliance. For 
 
J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 222 (1982) (offering evidence that 37.9% of individuals surveyed believed 
they would get caught if they engaged in tax evasion). 
394 See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 152, at 5 (examining the effects that various factors 
have on individuals’ willingness to comply with U.S. tax law). 
395 See IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/FY%202012%20enforcement%20and%20service%20results-%20Media. 
pdf (demonstrating that the IRS audit rate for the years 2006 to 2012 has hovered consistently 
around one percent). 
396 States that have attempted to publicly shame tax delinquents by using online websites 
have also released public statements regarding the efficacy of these measures. See, e.g., Steven 
Walters, Taxpayer List Scares Up Cash, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 30, 2006, at 3B (reporting 
decreases in the number of names on Wisconsin’s delinquent taxpayer list); see also Blank, supra 
note 288, at 552 (discussing various proposals to use public shaming in order to combat corporate 
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reciprocator taxpayers,397 statements from the taxing authority that individ-
uals change their behavior in response to collateral tax sanctions would 
confirm their belief that the government effectively deters tax noncompli-
ance. For taxpayers who fear sanctions that would make their failure to obey 
the tax law observable by others—such as suspension of a professional 
license—an announcement that such collateral tax sanctions are effective in 
forcing others to file their returns could lead these taxpayers to perceive that 
the negative signal of tax noncompliance is rare, and thus strong. 
4. When Drawbacks Outweigh Benefits 
On occasion, legislatures will enact collateral tax sanctions that fail all of 
the principles proposed above, creating significant drawbacks that may 
outweigh many of the potential compliance benefits of the sanctions. The 
deportation of lawful permanent residents who have committed a criminal 
tax offense involving willful and false statements398 is an illustration of such 
a collateral tax sanction. In cases like these, the taxing authority should not 
actively publicize the collateral tax sanction. As I have argued, the taxing 
authority will be ill-equipped to describe accurately a collateral tax sanction 
that stems from a standard that is subject to the interpretation of another 
agency. 399  Further, if the taxing authority publicizes this collateral tax 
sanction, such as deportation for tax offenses involving willfulness and false 
statements, individuals who perceive it to be disproportionate or unfair may 
direct their backlash at the taxing authority. Some might even suspect that 
the taxing authority works in concert with the non-tax agency to identify 
tax offenses that would allow the non-tax agency to subject the taxpayer to a 
harsh collateral tax sanction, such as deportation. In these cases, it is best 
for the taxing authorities to refrain from attempting to enhance compliance 
by publicizing the collateral tax sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a comprehensive analysis of an alternative ap-
proach to reducing tax noncompliance that can be deployed by federal, state, 
and local governments—collateral tax sanctions. As I have argued, collateral 
tax sanctions can promote voluntary tax compliance more effectively than 
the threat of additional monetary tax penalties, especially if governments 
increase public awareness of these sanctions. 
 
397 See supra subsection II.B.5. 
398 See supra subsection III.B.3. 
399 See supra subsection III.A.2. 
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Several unique aspects of collateral tax sanctions can encourage individ-
uals to report and pay their tax liabilities properly. First, collateral tax 
sanctions are more salient than traditional monetary tax penalties, which 
can lead to greater deterrence than traditional monetary tax penalties. 
Second, collateral tax sanctions provoke individuals’ loss-aversion biases and 
the endowment effect by targeting specific government benefits for which 
individuals have developed feelings of entitlement. Third, certain collateral 
tax sanctions can result in greater indirect economic costs than monetary tax 
penalties, particularly for individuals with greater abilities to pay. Fourth, 
the negative reputational signals of certain collateral tax sanctions can deter 
some individuals from engaging in tax noncompliance. Fifth, many collat-
eral tax sanctions are observable, causing them to bolster confidence among 
taxpayers motivated by feelings of reciprocity. Finally, collateral tax sanc-
tions can promote tax compliance as a duty of citizenship by clearly linking 
tax payments with valued government services. 
After considering the potential drawbacks that can result from existing 
or potential collateral tax sanctions, this Article has proposed a set of 
guiding principles that governments should consider when designing a 
collateral tax sanction to promote tax compliance. Under these principles, 
collateral tax sanctions are most effective as a means of encouraging compli-
ance where (1) the tax offense results from a violation of a tax rule, not a tax 
standard; (2) the sanction results from a tax offense that the tax law defines 
and that a taxing authority identifies; and (3) the collateral tax sanction is 
proportionate to the underlying tax offense. When these principles are 
satisfied, taxing authorities should actively publicize collateral tax sanctions 
in coordination with existing efforts to inform taxpayers of potential civil 
and criminal tax penalties. 
As tax scholars, policymakers, and lawyers are well aware, the tax law 
serves multiple purposes and often bears the burden of implementing social 
programs and policies that are unrelated to its core functions. Collateral tax 
sanctions, by contrast, require non-tax agencies and taxing authorities to 
share the responsibility of encouraging individuals to satisfy their obliga-
tions under the tax law. Governments in search of tax revenue should seize 
this opportunity. 
 
